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It’s who you know that counts: Board connectedness and CSR performance 
Abu Amina, Lamia Chouroub, Syed Kamalc, Mahfuja Malikd, Yang Zhaoe 
Abstract 
We examine whether and how board connections affect the firm's corporate social responsibilities 
(CSR). Grounded in the agency, resource dependence, and social network theory, our research 
predicts and finds that board connectedness is positively associated with CSR performance. This 
result is robust to a quasi-natural experiment, alternative measurement specifications, and an 
instrumental variable approach. Our findings suggest firms that operate in a complex business 
environment or require more advising (i.e. where demand for information is greater) benefit more 
from a well-networked board. Also, firms that are poorly governed, have high stock return 
volatility, low market capitalization, or low institutional ownership tend to benefit more from the 
well-connected board when the cost of acquiring information is higher. In addition, we show that 
independent directors’ abilities to gather information and resources from their networks can 
facilitate the transmission of information. Collectively, our study documents the informational 
advantage of a network as the predominant channel that allows a well-connected board to improve 
a firm’s CSR performance.   
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It’s who you know that counts: Board connectedness and CSR performance 
1. Introduction 
The resource dependence theory and social network theory indicate that a well-networked 
board member can be a better advisor and monitor because a higher number of connections 
improve access to information (Hillman et al., 1999) and increase influence (Adler and Kwon, 
2002). Additionally, the manager’s commitment to socially responsible activities largely depends 
on an existing corporate governance mechanism, which can benefit from well-connected directors. 
The importance of a firm’s investment in socially responsible activities is manifested by explosive 
growth in sustainable investments over the past decade, as the Forum for Sustainable and 
Responsible Investment report suggests.1 Given the importance of corporate social responsibility 
(CSR), it is intriguing that the relation between board connectedness and a firm’s CSR 
performance remains unstudied. Our paper aims to fill this gap by bridging these two branches of 
literature and testing predictions on a board’s external connections (measured using connections 
of independent directors) and the firm’s engagement in CSR activities.   
Resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) suggests that firms hire 
“resource-rich” directors who can provide firms with resources such as information, reputation, 
and advice, which can be strategic to the firm’s CSR performance. As directors become more 
externally connected, the board is likely to have greater access to information and resources, to be 
better at advising and monitoring, to reduce the information gap between the firm and external 
constituents, and to assist managers in adopting practices that can improve value-enhancing CSR. 
Consistent with this view, existing literature shows that well-connected independent directors 
facilitate the transmission of knowledge, information, and ideas (Hillman, 2005). Larker et al. 
(2013) find that board connections facilitate the exchange of information, which allows directors 
to provide deeper insights into evolving market conditions, to predict upcoming trends (Mizruchi, 
1996; Moore, 2001), and to reduce the information gap among different stakeholders (Schoorman 
et al., 1981). Besides, Coles et al. (2012) find that highly networked outside directors are well-
 
1 According to a 2018 report published by the Forum for Sustainable and Responsible Investment, about 12 trillion 
dollars in assets are currently managed under socially responsible investment strategies. There has been a 38% growth 
since 2016.  The report is available online at https://www.ussif.org/fastfacts.  
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positioned to have information about competitors, customers, and suppliers. As connections give 
access to more information, it is more likely that well-networked boards will be better at advising 
and monitoring that can improve the firms’ social performance. Therefore, we hypothesize that 
board connections are positively associated with a firm’s CSR performance. 
Agency theory suggests that boards of directors can offer a possible governance 
mechanism of monitoring entrenched or self-serving managers to mitigate wasteful CSR. 
Moreover, according to social network theory, external network connections allow directors to 
gain more influence and/or power (Adler and Kwon, 2002), which can be instrumental in enforcing 
governance measures. Therefore, it follows that well-connected directors are likely to enforce 
effective governance measures to mitigate the effects of self-serving managers. Another possible 
way a well-connected director can influence a manager is by designing compensation schemes 
closely related to the firm’s performance. When the CEO’s wealth and future stock performance 
are linked, s/he will be motivated to reduce wastefulness, including CSR.  Consistent with this 
view, Fogel et al. (2014) show that more powerful independent directors are associated with less 
value-destroying M&A, less free cash flow retention, less earnings management, and more CEO 
accountability, suggesting that they are better monitors. Similarly, Intintoli et al. (2018) find that 
the connectedness of independent, non-co-opted audit committee members is associated with 
lower earnings management and greater conservatism. As directors become more connected 
externally, the board is likely to get more information and have more influence (i.e., power) over 
the managers. As the power of the board increases with the network, it is more likely that the 
boards will be better at monitoring managers by adopting governance mechanisms that can reduce 
value-destroying CSR. Therefore, we hypothesize that board connections are negatively associated 
with a firm's CSR performance. Since there are two opposing views, predicting the effect of board 
connections on a firm’s CSR performance is difficult ex-ante. Hence, this is an empirical question.  
We follow the approach used in existing board network literature (Fracassi, 2017; Larker 
et al., 2013; Intintoli et al., 2018; Akbas et al., 2016) to measure board connectedness.  Using the 
BoardEx database, we argue that two boards are connected in any given year when one or more 
independent directors are sitting on both boards in that year. We focus on professional networks 
because the data of many independent directors’ social and educational connections are very 
limited. Our network measures are at the board-level; the network excludes duplication (i.e., two 
3 
 
or more connections to the same board) and connections within firms (i.e., connections between 
directors on the same board). To proxy for board connectedness, we first calculate the three 
centrality measures (1) degree centrality, (2) eigenvector centrality, and (3) betweenness centrality. 
Each of the three standard centrality measures represents a connectedness aspect. The first 
measure, degree centrality, counts a board’s direct connections to adjacent boards. The second 
measure, eigenvector centrality, evaluates how many boards are connected as well as the 
importance of each connected board. Finally, betweenness centrality examines the positioning 
advantage of a board in the entire network. To construct a composite measure for board 
connectedness, we first divide the sample into five quintiles each year based on the scores in 
degree, eigenvector, and betweenness centrality, respectively. We generate an aggregate measure 
(Q(N-score)) as an equally-weighted average quintile rank in each of the three centrality measures 
(Larker et al., 2013 and Intintoli et al., 2018).  
 We have collected CSR-related information from the MSCI ESG/Kinder, Lydenberg and 
Domini, Inc. (KLD) database, which provides environmental, social, and governance ratings for 
the largest 3,000 publicly traded U.S. companies, with 60 indicators across several attributes. 
Following the literature (Khan et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2020; Cronqvist and Yu, 2017; El Ghoul 
et al., 2011), we construct a net CSR score (the total strengths, minus the total concerns) using 
KLD’s five main social rating areas: environment, community, employee, diversity, and product. 
To complement our results, we constructed two additional proxies of CSR: i) CSR score2, using 
four components, following Adhikary (2016); and ii) CSR score3, a scaled CSR score following 
Lins et al. (2017).   
We base our analysis on an unbalanced panel of 16,477 firm-year observations for 2,820 
publicly traded U.S. firms from 2002 to 2013. We start with univariate statistics and fixed effects 
(FE) models that produce robust results with respect to industry and time invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity, as is common in the literature (Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Nofsinger et al., 2019). Using 
the aggregate board connectedness measure, we show that board connectedness is positively 
associated with the CSR score, which is consistent with the arguments postulated by the resource 
dependence theory. The effect is not only statistically significant, but it is also economically 
meaningful. We find that the CSR score of firms at the top quintile of overall board connectedness 
is 0.4632 points higher than that of firms at the bottom quintile of board connectedness. The results 
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for all the individual components of the centrality measures show a positive association between 
board connectedness and firms’ CSR performance. In line with the resource dependence theory, 
the findings indicate that critical resources and information (e.g., CSR practices of peers, trends in 
environmental standards, employee satisfaction practices) resulting  from the external connections 
of the directors enable the board to advise and guide the management in adopting CSR practices 
that maximize the shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests.  
Although we find that firms’ CSR increases with the overall connectedness of the board, 
we don’t know whether such improvement in CSR enhances or decreases the firm value. In 
unreported results, we show that the level of CSR predicted by board connections is positively 
associated with current and future Tobin’s Q. This result suggests that the market rewards the CSR 
activities by better-connected boards with a higher firm valuation. Hence, we interpret the positive 
association as evidence that firms on average experience a net positive benefit in their social 
performance from a well-connected board, all else being equal. 
Any board-related study could suffer from endogeneity concerns arising out of omitted 
correlated variable bias or reverse causality issues (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Omitted 
unobservable variables can induce spurious correlations between board connectedness and CSR 
policies. Besides, our result could suffer from reverse-causality, meaning that firms that spend 
more on CSR activities recruit more connected directors to benefit from these directors’ access to 
information and resources. To address endogeneity concerns, we augment our basic analysis by 
four additional analyses. First, we address omitted correlated variable bias and reverse causality 
by identifying instruments that satisfy relevance and exclusion conditions. Following prior 
literature on board connections (Faleye et al., 2014; Intintoli et al., 2018), we treat board 
connectedness (Q(N-score)) using two valid instruments 1) the fraction of independent directors 
who have attended MBA programs at elite institutions and 2) the average number of Fama-French 
48 industries the independent directors have worked for in the past. Using two-stage instrumental 
variable regression, we find a positive association between board connections and CSR 
performance, which is consistent with the OLS regression. Second, we use exogenous shock to the 
board’s external connections resulting from the deaths of independent directors in our quasi-
natural experiment. We apply the difference-in-differences (DiD) approach on a propensity-
matched sample to test the direction of plausible causality between a board’s connections and a 
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firm’s CSR score. Our identification strategy shows a robust decline in firm CSR performance 
following the death of independent directors, suggesting that the direction of causation is from the 
board connections to CSR and not the opposite. Third, we restrict our sample to firms whose boards 
have remained the same from the prior year to the current year (Faleye et al., 2014). In such firms, 
the changes in the focal firm’s board centrality are exogenous in nature and depend on the decisions 
of other firms. Our main results remain unchanged, delivering further evidence that our findings 
are unlikely attributable to reverse causality. Fourth, we control for the historical values of a 
board’s connections (lagged three years) and we add to our regression model the lagged values of 
the CSR score to further address unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality problems. In both 
instances, our findings remain robust. Also, we have implemented three additional robustness 
checking by re-estimating baseline regression using i) an alternative network centrality proxy by 
Akbas et al. (2016); ii) alternative CSR proxies by Lins et al. (2017) and Adhikary (2016), and iii) 
excluding the financial crisis period as suggested in Lins et al. (2017). Our original results remain 
unchanged. Overall, there is strong evidence that supports the notion that board connectivity 
matters for a firm’s CSR performance and that our results are unlikely to be driven by endogeneity 
concerns. 
 Having established a robust positive effect of board connections on CSR, we next examine 
how possible channels of board connections can improve firm CSR performance. The resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) predicts that connections to diverse groups allow 
individuals to access information (Hillman et al., 1999). We posit that better access to the firm- or 
industry-specific information by the independent directors through a diverse network could help a 
connected board develop better awareness and engagement of CSR for the firm. Prior literature 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008) shows that firms hire independent 
directors to cater to specific needs. Boone et al. (2007) and Coles et al. (2008) show that certain 
types of firms, such as those with advisory-focused boards and complex firms, need directors for 
advising roles. Therefore, we expect, in such firms, a stronger effect of a network on CSR, which 
will imply the informational advantage of networks. Our regression results show that, highly 
connected independent directors are associated with increased CSR performance in complex firms 
and firms with advisory focused boards. In summary, our findings suggest that firms with a greater 
demand for information benefit more from board connectedness in improving CSR performance.  
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In additional cross-sectional analysis we explore other scenarios when firms’ social 
performance is benefited from board connectedness. As suggested by Duchin et al. (2010), 
independent directors are less effective in improving corporate governance of the firms when 
information acquisition costs are high. Therefore, the effect of board connectedness on CSR 
performance should be more pronounced for firms that are poorly governed, have high stock return 
volatility, low market capitalization, or low institutional ownership, especially when it is costly to 
acquire information. Consistent with this idea, we find that in such firms incremental information 
advantages resulting from high board connections increase firms’ CSR performances.  
In a complementary analysis, we examine who these independent directors are connected 
to and how diversity in board network connections facilitate the transmission of information to 
improve the different components of the CSR score. Prior literature shows that diversity in network 
connections provides access to different types of information, knowledge, and opportunities that 
can positively affect the economic outcome.2 In the context of CSR, boards that are connected to 
diverse groups of external directors should be able to function as a conduit of information that can 
benefit managers to improve the performance of different components of the CSR score. To test 
our conjecture, we examine all five components of our CSR score and identify specific groups of 
people boards are connected to whose expertise on these matters would benefit the firm. For 
example, we find, that boards with the most network connections to i) independent directors 
working in the top 25 most charitable firms in the U.S.; ii) female independent directors working 
in other firms; iii) independent directors working in non-polluting industries; iv) independent 
directors working in the unionized industry, and v) independent directors in R&D intensive 
industries, tend to outperform the least connected boards in community, diversity, environment, 
employment, and product dimensions of the CSR Score. Collectively, these results show that 
network/connections to external constituents facilitate the transmission of resources and 
information that help managers learn best practices from peers in the business community. 
Together the results offer additional evidence of the informational advantage of networks and 
support the idea that well-connected boards have better access to information that can facilitate 
managers to make better CSR decisions. 
 
2 The application of diversity in network in the context of finance has been discussed in Larker et al., 2013; Wong et 
al., 2015; Chiu et al., 2012; Stuart and Yim, 2010; Fang et al., 2018. 
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Can our results be described by other explanations? Social network theory suggests that 
board connections can affect economic outcomes in two possible ways: information (Bjørnskov & 
Sønderskov, 2012) and influence (Adler and Kwon, 2002). The presence of a powerful 
independent director makes the board powerful, which can affect the economic outcome (Fogel, 
et al., 2014). Similarly, there is abundant literature (Barnea and Rubin, 2010; Surroca and Tribo, 
2008; Masulis and Reza, 2015) that suggests that a powerful CEO might engage in socially 
responsible activities for their own self-interest at the expense of shareholders. Therefore, 
influential boards and powerful CEOs can play important roles in CSR policy. If our proxy of 
board connectedness does not represent the informational advantage of the network, then it must 
capture the influence of the board network. Influence is more likely to be present as a mechanism 
for how board connections influence CSR when the CEO is less powerful. With this assumption, 
we examined the effect of board connectedness on CSR under weak and strong CEOs, using the 
difference between them as a measure of the influence effect. We use two proxies, i) CEO chair 
duality (Morse et al., 2011; Fracassi and Tate, 2012), and ii) Co-option (Coles et al., 2014). Our 
main variable of interest is the interaction term between the power proxies and board 
connectedness. Using both proxies, we find that the interaction term is not statistically significant 
at conventional thresholds. This result indicates that the influence channel of the network does not 
explain the positive association between the board connections and CSR performance. On the other 
hand, the coefficient on board connectedness (Q(N-score)) is positive and significant in both 
models, which is consistent with other findings, implying that board connectedness has an 
information mechanism. Although in our sample, we do not find support for the influence channel 
of the network, we interpret these results with caution, recognizing that in reality, it is extremely 
difficult to isolate information and influence effects of the network. 
Our study speaks to several streams of the literature. First, we add to the literature on 
director networks. Prior studies have examined the effect of director network on shareholders’ 
interests, including firm performance (Larker et al., 2013), informed trading by sophisticated 
traders (Akbas et al., 2016), merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions (Cai and Sevilir, 2012), 
board compensation (Ferris et al., 2019), firm valuation (Fogel et al., 2014), and financial reporting 
quality (Intintoli et al., 2018). To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document that the 
effect of board connectedness goes beyond the financial outcome; it has a positive impact on a 
firm’s social performance, as evidenced by the CSR Score. The resources and information 
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exchanged by highly networked boards improve social outcomes especially for those firms that 
benefit the most such as complex firms, firms with an advisory-focused board, poorly governed 
firms, high stock return volatility, low market capitalization firms, and firms with low institutional 
investors.  
Second, our study contributes to the burgeoning literature on CSR. Prior studies in the CSR 
literature find that the presence of independent directors has at best mixed effect on a firm’s CSR 
performance (Arora and Dharwadhar, 2011; Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Rupley et al., 2012; Walls et 
al., 2012; Harjoto et al., 2015). However, these studies offer no direct evidence on how 
independent directors contribute to a firm’s social performance. To the best of our knowledge, this 
is the first study that not only establishes that the director’s network is an important determinant 
of the firm’s CSR performance but also documents the informational advantage of networks as the 
predominant channel by which well-connected directors improve firm’s CSR performance.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We develop our hypothesis in Section 2. 
Section 3 describes the variables and methodology. Section 4 provides the empirical results, and 
the channel analysis is given in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes our study. 
   
2. Literature and hypotheses  
2.1. Agency, resource dependence, and social network theories 
There is an inherent conflict of interest between shareholders and the managers (Fama and 
Jensen, 1983) in a firm because of the separation of ownership and the control of the corporation 
(Berle and Means, 1932). The resultant agency cost necessitates the fiduciary responsibilities by 
the board of directors to protect shareholders’ interests. By minimizing agency conflicts, firms can 
achieve desired economic and/or social outcomes. The board plays a critical role in mitigating 
agency costs arising from agency conflicts by (1) implementing monitoring/governance 
mechanisms (Hart, 1995) and/or (2) aligning the interests of managers with those of shareholders 
using incentive schemes (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Independent directors are more likely to be 
diligent in acting as a fiduciary (Fama, 1980) by implementing a broad set of governance 
mechanisms (including compensation packages) to reduce managerial opportunism and align the 
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interests of managers, shareholders, and stakeholders to maximize firms’ financial and social 
outcomes.  
Agency theory emphasizes the board’s monitoring responsibilities, whereas resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) views resource providing functions as the primary 
responsibility of the board. According to resource dependence theory, the board of directors offers 
four types of resources: (1) advice and counsel (Westphal, 1999), (2) legitimacy and reputation 
(Daily and Schwenk, 1996), (3) a channel for communicating information to and/or from external 
parties (Hillman et al., 1999), and (4) assistance in obtaining resources from external parties (Zald, 
1969). That is, resource dependence theory emphasizes the expertise and network connections of 
the board in achieving economic/social outcomes. Board members bring knowledge and expertise, 
which enables them to provide advice to the management that can be strategic to the operations of 
the firm. Moreover, the director’s network connections (including previous industry experience, 
executive-level friendships, and directorships in other firms) can link the firm with key 
constituents (suppliers, buyers, social groups) to facilitate communication that reduces the 
asymmetry of information.  
Linking resource dependence theory to the concept of social capital, as asserted in the 
social network theory, Hillman and Dalziel (2003) suggest that human capital (experience and 
expertise) and social capital (external network ties) of the directors create board capital for the 
firm. Just like we consider physical capital and human capital as valuable resources, social capital 
has value because it provides directors the opportunity to access information in their social network 
(Bjørnskov and Sønderskov, 2013) and to generate power/influence (Adler and Kwon, 2002). That 
is, in addition to information, social capital allows directors to gain the power to influence others 
around them for the benefit of the firm or for the benefit of someone they choose to support.    
In this paper, we examine whether the connectedness of the board of directors affects a 
firm’s CSR performance. The board may play a role in enhancing the firm’s CSR performance by 
monitoring (agency theory), advising (resource dependence theory), exerting an influence (social 
network theory), or a combination thereof.  
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2.2. Value-enhancing view of CSR 
The value-enhancing view of CSR suggests that CSR activities positively affect 
shareholders by serving the interests of different stakeholders. Managers may enhance firm value 
by recognizing and serving the needs of various stakeholders (Freeman, 1994; Cornell and Shapiro, 
1987). This view is referred to as “doing well by doing good” (Edmans, 2011; Deng et al., 2013; 
Flammer, 2015; Ferrell et al., 2016). According to the value-enhancing view of CSR, when firms 
promote diversity, contribute to the community, improve working conditions, and keep 
environmental commitments, external constituents reward them.  
Supporting the positive view of CSR, extant literature finds that CSR serves the interests 
of the shareholders by attracting and retaining higher-quality employees (Turban and Greening, 
1997; Greening and Turban, 2000), leading to higher productivity and higher firm performance 
(Edmans, 2011; Edmans et al., 2015; Fauver et al. 2018). CSR activities also generate social capital 
and trust that result in higher profitability and sales growth for the firm (Lins et al., 2017). 
Moreover, CSR acts as insurance against idiosyncratic firm-specific legal risk (Godfrey et al., 
2009) as well as an insurance policy that pays off at the time of investor’s confidence crisis (Lins 
et al., 2017). 
We expect the board of directors to support the value-enhancing CSR activities of the firm 
as part of their fiduciary responsibilities. A long list of studies (Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Brown et al., 
2006; Rupley et al., 2012) provide evidence to support the monitoring role of the board in 
improving firms’ CSR performance. The main governance mechanisms these studies focus on are 
board independence, board size, and board diversity. However, when it comes to board 
connectedness, we expect that the advisory function of the board should play a dominant role in 
improving the value-enhancing CSR performance of the firm. As we discussed earlier, the 
director’s network establishes a link between the firm and the external environment. Externally 
connected directors offer managers critical resources, such as expertise, skill, information, advice, 
and influence, which can be strategic to firms’ CSR performance. Well-connected boards facilitate 
the transmission of information (e.g., CSR practices of peers, trends in environmental standards, 
employee satisfaction practices) among different parties and thereby reduce information 
asymmetry and can assist managers in adopting CSR-friendly policies. Consistent with this view, 
existing literature shows that well-connected independent directors facilitate the transmission of 
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knowledge, information, and ideas (Hillman, 2005). Larker et al. (2013) find that firms benefit 
from more connected boards because board connections are a channel by which boards exchange 
information. This information advantage allows directors to provide deeper insights into evolving 
market conditions, predict upcoming trends (Mizruchi, 1996; Moore, 2001), and reduce the 
information gap among different stakeholders (Schoorman et al., 1981). In a similar vein, Coles et 
al. (2012) suggest that well-connected outside directors are well-positioned to have information 
about competitors, customers, and suppliers.  
Therefore, the connectedness of the board of directors is expected to provide greater access 
to information and reduce the information gap. Connected directors are likely to be better advisors 
and monitors and likely to assist managers in adopting practices that could improve value-
enhancing CSR. This leads to our first hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 1: Board connections are positively associated with a firm’s CSR performance. 
2.3. Value-destroying view of CSR 
The value-destroying view of CSR suggests that managers engage in socially responsible 
activities for their self-interest at the expense of shareholders. This negative view of CSR is 
advocated by Milton Friedman, who famously stated that “the social responsibility of business is 
to increase its profits.” According to Friedman (1970), the only responsibility of the management 
is to increase profit and pass earnings back to the shareholders, who would then decide on their 
own whether or how to engage in social giving as they see fit. Engagement in social giving by the 
managers is a violation of their sole responsibility and is often motivated by private benefits.  
In a similar spirit, Tirole (2001) suggests that managers may abuse social activism to 
advance their own agendas (i.e., personal moral values or political interests) at the expense of 
investors. Supporting this negative view of CSR, Barnea and Rubin (2010) show that managers 
overinvest in CSR for their private benefit, such as improving personal reputation or gaining media 
coverage. Surroca and Tribo (2008) find, in an international context, that firms with more 
managerial entrenchment engage more in CSR activities. Masulis and Reza (2015) show that 
corporate donations serve the interests of CEOs and reduce the valuation of firms’ cash holdings. 
According to Adhikari (2016), firms with greater analyst coverage, a proxy for governance, have 
lower CSR performance. Petrenko et al. (2016) show that CEO narcissism positively affects CSR, 
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suggesting that CSR initiatives may result from leaders’ personal need for attention and image 
reinforcement. More recently, Chen et al. (2020) show that firms’ CSR is driven by agency motives 
and tax avoidance considerations, suggesting that managers “do good with other people's 
money.” Finally, Withisuphakorn and Jiraporn (2019) show that when managers bear greater costs 
of CSR, through their equity stake, they reduce CSR engagements. 
The board can offer a possible mechanism to mitigate wasteful CSR. As we mentioned 
earlier as part of our social capital discussion, external connections allow directors to gain more 
influence or power. Therefore, well-connected directors are likely to monitor the entrenched/self-
serving managers and enforce effective governance to reduce some of the wasteful CSR 
investments. Consistent with this view, Fogel et al. (2014) show that powerful independent 
directors are associated with less value-destroying M&A, less free cash flow retention, fewer 
earnings management, and increased CEO accountability. Similarly, Intintoli et al. (2018) find that 
the connectedness of independent, non-co-opted audit committee members is associated with 
lower earnings management and greater conservatism. Besides, well-connected, influential 
directors may reduce value-destroying CSR activities by designing compensation schemes for 
managers closely related to firm performance. For instance, Fogel et al. (2014) find some evidence 
that CEO pay is more performance-related if more powerful independent directors dominate the 
board or the compensation committee.  
Therefore, as directors become more connected externally, the board is likely to have 
access to better information and be able to monitor management more effectively. Moreover, as 
their power or influence grows with their extended network, these boards could likely enforce 
better governance mechanisms for the firm that could reduce value-destroying CSR activities. This 
leads to our second hypothesis.    
Hypothesis 2: Board connections are negatively associated with a firm’s CSR 
performance.  
 
 
 
13 
 
3. Data, variables, and summary statistics 
3.1. Sample construction  
We collect board of director information from the BoardEx database, which contains 
biographical, social, and professional connections; education; and other activity-related 
information. We restrict our sample to boards of directors for U.S. firms only. CSR-related 
information is collected from the MSCI ESG/ Kinder, Lydenberg and Domini Inc. (KLD) 
database, which provides environmental, social, and governance ratings for the largest 3,000 
publicly traded U.S. companies and uses 60 indicators across several attributes. Although the KLD 
data are available from the early 1990s, our sample period is between 2002 and 2013 (following 
Adhikary, 2016). The start date of the sample ensures that our estimates are not affected by the 
limited coverage of firms by KLD prior to 2002. Also, at the same time, we needed to start in the 
early years to find a suitable match for the difference-in-differences analysis. Moreover, KLD has 
maintained consistency in defining its CSR score since the beginning of the 2000s also justifies 
the start year of our sample.   
In addition to the KLD and BoardEx data, we obtain firms’ financial information, and stock 
price information, from the Compustat, and CRSP databases respectively. Also, following prior 
literature (Hong and Anderson, 2011; Kim et al., 2012; Gao and Zhang, 2015; Dutordoir et al., 
2018; Buchanan et al., 2018; Chen et al., 2018, Lins et al., 2017), we exclude firms in the financial 
sector (SIC codes 6000 to 6999). After merging all the datasets, our final sample for all empirical 
estimations comprises 2,820 firms and 16,477 firm-year observations.  
3.2. Constructing our CSR measures 
Our dependent variable is the CSR score, which measures a firm’s CSR performance as 
obtained from the KLD database. Defining CSR performance is a challenging task because of the 
vast and multidimensional scope of CSR activities (McWilliams et al., 2006; Barnett, 2007). The 
KLD database provides a good opportunity for quantifying CSR performance along the following 
seven dimensions: community, workforce diversity, employee relations, human rights, 
environmental impact, product quality, and corporate governance. The database also tracks 
whether firms’ operations are related to alcohol, gaming, firearms, military contracting, and 
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nuclear- or tobacco-related activities.3 Following prior literature on CSR, we exclude (a) human 
rights (Chen et al., 2020), which only apply to a small sample of firms with overseas operations, 
(b) corporate governance (El Ghoul et al., 2011; Cronqvist and Yu, 2017), which is fundamentally 
different from CSR, and (c) controversial business issues (Chen et al., 2020), which only represent 
concerns. In the KLD database, the data are presented as a binary summary of positive (strength) 
and negative (concerns) ratings. In each case, if KLD assigns a rating of a particular issue (either 
positive or negative), then KLD indicates the rating with a “1” in the corresponding cell. If the 
firm does not have a strength or concern on a particular issue, this is indicated with a “0.”   
Following the literature (Khan et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2020; Cronqvist and Yu, 2017; El 
Ghoul et al., 2011), we construct a net CSR score (total strengths minus total concerns) using the 
five main KLD social rating areas: environment, community, employee, diversity, and product. 
We also estimate the component-specific CSR score by subtracting the number of concerns from 
the number of strengths in each category.   
3.3. Board networking measure  
Two boards are connected when one or more independent director sits on both boards in any 
given year. For our estimation, we construct the network to include all boards in each year. In such 
networks, boards are vertices (nodes) and common directors are connections (links) between 
boards. In our board-level network, we include the current professional connections of independent 
directors only, because the data on many independent directors’ social and education connections 
are very limited. Because we focus on board-level networks, we do not consider director-level 
connections within the board. Moreover, we exclude duplicate connections, that is, multiple 
common directors between two boards, from our network construction.     
We measure a board’s connectedness using a variety of centrality measures. The number of 
connections a board has is the centrality measure of Degree. The degree measure evaluates a 
board’s direct connections to adjacent boards. A board with a high degree score maintains strong 
connections to many other boards. Such connections allow the focal board to access information 
 
3 Based on an extensive analysis of surveys, CSR reports, press releases, and regulatory reports, MSCI provides CSR 
information for over 3,000 of the largest U.S. firms that account for 98% of the U.S. market’s value. 
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from connected ones. However, information collected from connected firms may be trivial or 
redundant, especially when they are small and local.  
Another centrality measure, Eigenvector centrality, not only counts how many boards are 
connected but also considers the importance of each connected board. The eigenvector centrality 
of board v (CE(v)) is defined as the sum of all adjacent boards’ eigenvector centrality scores:  
𝐶𝐸(𝑣) =
1
𝜆
∑ 𝐴𝑣,𝑗𝐶𝐸(𝑗)
𝑁
𝑗=1 . 
A board has a high eigenvector centrality score if it is connected to other boards with high 
scores. We begin the calculation process by assigning a score of one to all boards in the network, 
and, in each iteration, the score of any board v is calculated as the sum of its adjacent boards’ scores 
received in the previous iteration. In the above formula, matrix A is an adjacent matrix capturing 
whether any board j is adjacent to the focal board v. As the centrality score evolves in the iteration 
process, factor λ ensures that the centrality scores converge in the end. 
Besides degree and eigenvector centrality measures, we calculate a centrality measure based 
on the geodesic path. A path in the network is defined as a sequence of connections that joins two 
vertices. The path with the smallest number of connections between two reachable vertices is the 
geodesic path. The Betweenness of vertex v is the sum of its betweenness ratios, which are defined 
as the number of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t passing through vertex v, divided by the 
number of geodesic paths from s to t. In formulaic form, this is  
𝐶𝐵(𝑣) = ∑
𝜎𝑠𝑡(𝑣)
𝜎𝑠𝑡
𝑠≠𝑣≠𝑡∈𝑉
𝑠≠𝑡
. 
where the denominator is the number of geodesic paths from vertex s to vertex t, and the numerator 
is the number of geodesic paths from s to t with vertex v on the geodesic path. Betweenness 
centrality measures evaluate the positioning advantage of a board in the entire network. A board 
with a high betweenness score is more likely to act as an information conduit and has superior 
access to global information within the entire network. 
In our sample, the number of listed firms gradually increases over time. This makes 
eigenvector and betweenness centrality measures less comparable over time. To address this issue, 
we divide the sample into five quintiles in each year based on degree, eigenvector, and betweenness 
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centralities, respectively.4 Thus, our aggregated board connected measure is defined as the equally-
weighted average quintile rank in each of the three centrality measures. Our aggregate board 
connectedness measure (Q(N-score)) ranges between 1 and 5, where boards in the top (bottom) 
quintile are the most (least) connected, according to the different centrality measures.  
3.4. Control variables  
Following the CSR and board literatures (Ferrell et al., 2016; Chen et al., 2020; Dyck et 
al., 2019; Faleye et al., 2014; Intintoli, et al., 2018; Dhaliwal et al., 2011), we include in our 
empirical analysis several firm-, board-, and CEO-specific controls known to influence firms’ CSR 
performance. CSR activities are positively associated with large, profitable firms and firms with a 
high valuation. Therefore, we include proxies for firm size (log(Asset)), profitability (ROA), and 
valuation (Tobin’s Q). On the other hand, firms’ leverage and dividend decisions can affect their 
overall cash flow and thus their CSR performance. Therefore, we proxy for leverage (defined as 
long- and short-term debt to asset ratio, i.e. Leverage) and for dividends (Dividend/asset). In 
addition, we control for firms’ cash balances (Cash/Asset) and Firm age (is the difference between 
observation year and the listing year), two factors that also influence a firm’s CSR performance.  
For board-specific controls, following prior literature (Jo and Harjoto, 2012; Rupley et al., 
2012), we include Board independence (the proportion of independent directors on the board) as 
one of our control variables. Prior literature documents that CEOs can use their network to 
negotiate with lenders (Engelberg et al., 2012). It is also documented that CEOs or top executives 
have ties with government officials (Faccio, 2006) or politicians (Bertrand et al., 2018; Faccio et 
al., 2006) and that these ties could create value for the firm. Therefore, we include CEO 
connections in our regression model as a control. We measure the CEO network as the natural log 
of the size of the CEO’s networks plus 1. CEOs’ connections also make CEOs more powerful 
themselves (El-Khatib et al., 2015). Prior literature has documented that a powerful CEO can 
negatively influence firms’ CSR activities (Jiraporn and Chintrakarn, 2013). To control for CEO 
power, we use CEO chair duality as a proxy, where the variable equals 1 if the CEO is also the 
chairman of the board, and 0 otherwise.  
 
4 Larcker et al. (2013) and Intintoli et al. (2018) also rank centrality measures by quintile. Chuluun et al. (2014), 
among others, construct their aggregate centrality measure from betweenness, degree, and eigenvector centralities.   
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Finally, we include industry and year fixed effects to account for industry-specific or year-
specific characteristics that influence firms’ CSR performance. For industry fixed effects, we 
define industries by one-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes. Table A1 in the 
appendix defines all variables used in this study. To mitigate the effect of extreme values, we 
winsorize the continuous variables at the 1st and the 99th percentiles. 
3.5. Summary statistics  
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. The mean value of 
CSR score is -0.24, which implies that considering all five areas of CSR, on average, firms’ total 
number of concerns (mean, 1.53) are higher than their total number of strengths (mean, 1.30). The 
median value of net CSR scores for each component is 0 and range from -5 to 8 for the firms in 
our sample.  
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The average (median) quintile ranking of board connectedness is 2.95 (3). The average 
CEO network in our sample of firms is about 780; about 82% of directors are independent 
directors; and in about two-thirds of cases, the CEO is also the chairman of the board. On an 
average, firms have $5.4 billion of book asset value; are 23 years old; have a leverage of 22% with 
the profitability of 2.0%; keep on an average about 13% cash in proportion to the asset, and pay 
about 1% dividend and valuation multiples (Tobin’s Q) of 1.72.      
4. Empirical results  
We first present a baseline regression of CSR on board connectedness in Section 4.1. In 
Section 4.2, we report results addressing endogeneity concerns. Specifically, we estimate two-
stage least squares regression with instrumental variable, a difference-in-differences analysis using 
an independent director’s death as a quasi-natural experiment, and additional tests to check 
possible reverse causality. In Section 4.3, we report the results of several additional robustness 
checks.  
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4.1. Main evidence for board connectedness and CSR performance  
To explore the relation between firms’ CSR performance and board connectedness, we use 
the following regression model:  
𝐶𝑆𝑅 𝑆𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒𝑖 𝑡 =  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝑄(𝑁 − 𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑒)𝑖 𝑡−1 +  𝛽2𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑛𝑒𝑡𝑤𝑜𝑟𝑘 𝑖 𝑡−1  +
𝛽3𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑖𝑟 𝑑𝑢𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖 𝑡−1  +  𝛽4 𝐵𝑜𝑎𝑟𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑝𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑖 𝑡−1 +  𝛽5𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑖 𝑡−1 +
 𝛽6𝐿𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑖 𝑡−1  +  𝛽7 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 𝑡−1 + 𝛽8𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ/𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 𝑡−1 + 𝛽9 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑑/𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑖 𝑡−1 +
𝛽10 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛′𝑠 𝑄𝑖 𝑡−1 +  +𝛽11𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑖 𝑡−1  + ∑ 𝛾𝑗 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 + ∑ 𝜋𝑘 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦_𝐷𝑢𝑚𝑚𝑦 +
 𝜃𝑖,𝑡.                                    
Here, 𝑖 denotes firms, and 𝑡 denotes years. In the above regression model, all the 
explanatory variables are lagged by one year to partially mitigate endogeneity concerns (see 
Section 4.2 for a discussion of endogeneity concerns). See Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4 for definitions 
of the dependent and independent variables. In the above specification, our main independent 
variable of interest is Q(N-score), and the dependent variable is the CSR score.  
Table 2 presents the regression results of board connectedness on firms’ CSR performance. 
We report the effect of individual centrality measures in Columns 1 to 3. Column 4 reports the 
effect of an aggregate centrality measure on firms’ CSR performance. In Column 1, we examine 
the effect of the quintile ranking of Degree centrality on firms’ CSR score incorporating the usual 
firm- and board-level controls, along with industry and year fixed effects. The coefficient on the 
quintile ranking of Degree centrality is 0.0964, which is significant at the 1% level. The coefficient 
estimate implies that firms in the top quintile of Degree centrality see a 0.39-point [0.0964*(5-1) 
= 0.39] increase in CSR score compared to firms in the lowest quintile of degree connections.  
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
Degree centrality proxies for firms’ direct connections to other firms through connecting 
directors. In that regard, firms within the highest quintile of degree centrality have better access to 
local information of adjacent firms. A positive relation then implies that the firm’s ability to collect 
information improves the firm’s CSR performance. The second measure is the quintile ranking of 
Eigenvector centrality, which considers the influence of each firm in the network. The positive 
and highly significant coefficient of Eigenvector centrality implies that all else being equal, the 
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firms in the top quintile of Eigenvector centrality, that are most exposed to the influence of central 
firms in the network, have CSR scores 0.50 points higher than firms in the bottom quintile. Firms 
in the highest quintile of Eigenvector centrality are more likely to undertake CSR activities because 
of their connections to the most influential firms in the network.  
Our third measure of centrality is the quintile ranking of betweenness. Our results show, 
all else equal, firms in the top quintile of betweenness has CSR scores 0.35 points higher than 
firms in the bottom quintile. This suggests that firms in the highest quintile of Betweenness 
centrality have better access to richer information about other firms’ CSR practices that might 
positively influence the CSR policies of high connected firms.  
Our final measure is Q(N-score), an aggregate measure that takes the average of the quintile 
rankings of all three centrality measures in each year, and then reports the quintile of that average. 
Our aggregate measure of board connectedness Q(N-score) loads positively with the firm’s CSR 
performance. The point estimate of 0.1158 implies that the CSR score of firms at the top quintile 
of board connectedness have CSR scores 0.4632 (0.1158 ∗ (5 − 1)) points higher than firms in 
the bottom quintile, all else equal.  
The results from the individual components of centrality measures as well as the aggregate 
measure of centrality support Hypothesis 1, that is, board connectedness is positively associated 
with firms’ CSR performance. In line with resource dependence theory, the results indicate that 
critical resources, such as information (e.g., CSR practices of peers, trends in environmental 
standards, employee satisfaction practices) resulting from the external connection of the directors, 
enable the board to advise and guide the management to adopt value-enhancing CSR practices. 
Since CSR scores are point values and not actual dollars spent, it is difficult to estimate the 
economic effect of board centrality via CSR scores. However, to contextualize things, our point 
estimate suggests that moving from the middle quintile ranking to the top, firm CSR improves by 
0.23 points (from an average CSR score of -0.23)  
Although not the focus of our study, the coefficients on the control variables provide 
insights into firms’ CSR activities. We find a positive association between CEO network size and 
a firm’s CSR performance, which implies that the firm’s CSR practices benefit from the CEO’s 
personal network. However, CEO chair duality is not significant, which may suggest that CSR 
decisions are not driven by powerful CEOs. Besides, we also confirm results reported in prior 
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literature about the positive and significant associations between Firm size, Dividend/assets, 
Tobin’s Q, Cash/assets, and CSR score in all model specifications. The association between 
Leverage and CSR performance is significant and negative, a result that is consistent with prior 
literature. We also find a positive but insignificant coefficient on Board independence. Because 
our main variable of interest is board connectedness (Q(N-score)), which is constructed at the 
board level, the effect of Board independence could be partially subsumed by board-level 
connectedness.5  
Next, we estimate separate regressions for each CSR component to examine whether 
directors’ networks equally influence all five CSR attributes. Panel A of Table 3 reports the results 
for the component-specific CSR regressions. Results in Columns 1, 2, and 3 show that board 
connectedness positively affects firms’ community, diversity and environmental net scores. 
However, in Column 4 and 5, we do not find any association between directors’ network centrality 
and a firm’s employee and product scores. According to KLD, the product attribute chiefly 
measures innovation, product safety, product quality, R&D, and marketing/advertising-related 
issues, whereas employment includes union relations, layoff policies, and profit-sharing. These 
issues might be better related to the firm’s operational strategies, rather than to their social 
behavior, explaining the lack of a relationship. In our channel analysis, we discuss situations when 
diversity in the director’s network connections can bring additional information advantage to 
managers for improving the component-specific CSR scores. Finally, since the majority of the 
components load positively with board connectedness, it is less likely that the results are driven by 
one specific component.  
 [Insert Table 3 about here] 
In addition to component analysis, we also investigate the association between board 
connectedness and firms’ CSR strengths and CSR concerns (following Kim et al., 2012; Jiraporn 
et al., 2014). In Panel B of Table 3, we find a positive association between board connectedness 
and CSR strengths, but no relation with CSR concerns. However, it is interesting to note that a 
highly connected CEO tends to reduce CSR concerns and improve CSR strengths. For, un-
 
5 As a robustness check, we exclude our main variable of interest and run the regression with board independence 
along with other controls. The un-tabulated results show that Board independence is positively associated with CSR 
when Q(N-score) is not included in the model.   
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tabulated results of CSR components and strengths/concerns analyses, we report qualitatively 
similar findings for all three measures of boards’ network centrality: betweenness, degree, and 
eigenvector.  
Although we find that the firm’s CSR increases with the overall connectedness of the 
board, we don’t know whether such improvement in CSR is value-enhancing or value-decreasing. 
It is well understood in the CSR literature that CSR can be used to serve shareholder interests, or 
it can be used to serve managers’ interests (Edmans, 2011; Deng, et al., 2013; Flammer, 2015; 
Ferrell, et al., 2016; Masulis and Reza, 2015; Adhikari, 2016; Petrenko et al., 2016 and Chen et 
al., 2020). To address this concern, we first regress CSR score on our measure of board 
connectedness (Q(N-score)) and estimate the predicted CSR score, which is induced by overall 
board connections. Next, we estimate the regression of the firm’s valuation (Tobin’s Q) on 
predicted CSR scores to understand whether well-connected boards are promoting value-
enhancing or value-decreasing CSR. In unreported results, we find that the level of CSR predicted 
by board connections is positively associated with current and future Tobin’s Q.  In all the 
instances, the tests are inconsistent with the argument that better-connected boards are engaging 
in CSR activities that destroy value. Rather the results seem to indicate that the market rewards 
the CSR activities by better-connected boards with a higher firm valuation. 
Collectively, we provide empirical evidence in support of Hypothesis 1, which posits that 
board connectedness provides greater access to information and resources which reduce the 
information gap between firm and external constituents and in turn assist managers in adopting 
practices to improve value-enhancing CSR.  
4.2. Endogeneity concerns  
So far, our results indicate that there is a positive association between the board’s 
connectivity and CSR. But any board-related study could suffer from endogeneity concerns arising 
out of omitted variable bias or reverse causality issues (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1988). Omitted 
unobservable variables can induce spurious correlations between connectedness and CSR policies. 
It is also possible that our result could suffer from reverse causality, meaning that firms that spend 
more on CSR activities recruit more connected directors to benefit from these directors’ access to 
information and resources. For these reasons, in the following section, we employ various 
approaches to check whether our results are robust to endogeneity concerns.   
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4.2.1. Instrumental variables approach 
One of the ways we address endogeneity is by estimating two-stage least squares 
regressions. For this analysis, we need the instrument(s) that satisfy the relevance and exclusion 
conditions. The relevance condition states that the instrument should be correlated with the 
suspected endogenous independent variable (which in our case is Q(N-score)). The second 
important condition is that the instrument should be related to the dependent variable (CSR score) 
only through the treatment variable (Q(N-score)) after including controls; that is, it should be 
unrelated to the error term. Using instruments that satisfy these conditions can account for both 
omitted variable bias and reverse causality. 
Our choice of instruments to treat the endogenous independent variable is motivated by 
prior studies on the effect of board connections on a firm’s corporate policies (Faleye et al., 2014; 
Intintoli et al., 2018). Our first instrument is the fraction of independent directors who have 
attended MBA programs at an elite institution (Fraction_indep_MBA).6 To estimate the fraction, 
in each firm-year, we first identify whether an independent director has an MBA degree from an 
elite institution. This instrument meets two conditions. Attending the elite program allows the 
independent director to connect with other alumni who attended the same elite program. As most 
of these elite programs are old and prestigious, it is likely that independent directors attending 
these institutions will have greater opportunity to be invited to serve as directors on boards, a factor 
that enhances connectedness. Also, it meets the exclusion condition, as ex-ante, independent 
directors choosing an elite program are unlikely to be correlated with future CSR policy of the 
firm. Our second instrument is the average number of Fama-French 48 industries the independent 
directors (Sector_indep) have worked for in the past. This instrument meets the two conditions. It 
is likely that board members who have worked in a wide variety of industries have picked up 
connections in those industries, this is an example of the relevance condition. It is unlikely that 
experiences in other industries would affect their focus on CSR except to the extent they have 
picked up additional connections.   
  Table 4, Columns 1 and 2, report the results of the instrumental variables estimation for 
CSR score. The regressions include the same control variables, industry, and year fixed effects as 
 
6 We follow Useem and Karabel (1986) and Fang et al. (2018) when defining elite institutions.  
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in the baseline specification. Column 1 reports the first-stage regression estimates of 
Fraction_indep_MBA, and Sector_indep as instruments for board connectedness (Q(N-score)). 
Consistent with our expectations, we find that both instruments separately have a positive and 
significant effect on the board’s connections.  
The Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic for the first-stage regression exceeds the conventional 
threshold (10% critical value (i.e., 16.38), as reported by Stock and Yogo, 2002) rejecting that the 
instruments are weak and supporting the relevance condition. Also, we fail to reject the null 
hypothesis of an overidentification (Hansen J) test, and so have no evidence of validity violations.7 
Both tests support the relevance and exclusion restrictions.  
The first-stage results indicate that a 1% increase in the fraction of independent directors 
who attended elite MBA programs (Fraction_indep_MBA) increases overall board connection 
(Q(N-score)) by half a quintile. If the average independent director’s prior sector experience 
(Sector_indep) increases by 1%, then the overall board’s connectivity increases by 1.5 quintiles.   
In Column 2, we report the second-stage regression estimates. The effect of Q(N-score) on 
CSR score is positive and significant. The point estimates suggest that a move from the bottom 
quintile of connected boards to the top quintile (as driven by Fraction_indep_MBA and 
Sector_indep) increases firms’ CSR score by 1 point (0.20 ∗ (5 − 1)). The results support our 
hypothesis that well-connected boards positively affect a firm’s CSR performance 
Thus, our results are robust to the use of instrumental variables estimation, suggesting that 
our original non-instrumented results cannot be explained by endogeneity concerns. 
4.2.2. Difference-in-differences analysis using directors’ deaths  
 We use an independent director’s death as a quasi-natural experiment to further address 
issues related to endogeneity. An exogenous shock to the board’s connections due to the death of 
independent directors tests the direction of plausible causality between a board’s connections and 
a firm’s CSR policy. The death of an independent director not only alters the board’s professional 
 
7 As a robustness check, we re-estimate results in Columns 1 and 2 but apply generalized methods of moments (GMM). 
Our point estimates and statistical significance are comparable to those obtained when using the 2SLS method. The 
untabulated results are available upon request.  
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connections to other companies it could also have a profound effect on a firm’s CSR policies. 8 In 
this section, we exploit the exogenous decrease in a board’s connections resulting from the death 
of an independent director and apply the difference-in-differences (DiD) approach on a propensity-
matched sample to identify its impact on the firm’s CSR score. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
We obtained the director’s death information from BoardEx (following Fracassi, 2017) to 
identify the firms that lost an independent director in our sample at any point in time.9 We create 
a dummy variable Death_dum that equals 1 if an independent director has died in any year and 
zero otherwise.10 We define our treatment group as the firms that experienced a death whereas, the 
control group comprises firms that did not see any death of independent directors in our sample of 
firms at any point in time, but they are similar to the treatment firms along several important 
dimensions. For propensity score matching, we use board connectivity (Q(N-score)), CEO 
network, CEO chair duality, Board independence, Firm size, Leverage, Profitability, Cash/asset, 
Dividend/asset, Tobin’s Q, Firm age, Year, and Industry as matching criteria. The control group 
is matched to the treatment group based on the matching criteria measured the year prior to the 
shock to avoid any endogenous selection of variables. We also require that treatment and control 
groups belong to the same industry and year before the shock to avoid potential confounding 
effects. We restrict our analysis to non-missing values for all matching and outcome variables 
(CSR score). We then estimate propensity scores using a probit model where the dependent 
variable is Death_dum and the explanatory variables include all the independent variables included 
in the baseline model. We match based on the propensity score using the nearest neighbor matching 
with a caliper of 0.01. The matched pairs are used for DiD estimation using regression analysis to 
estimate the effect of the deaths of independent directors on firms’ CSR performance.      
 
8 Several previous studies have used the death of a director as an exogenous shock. For example, Fracassi (2017) 
reports dissimilar investment policies following the death of a connecting independent director. Examples of other 
findings include a decline in firm performance when the CEO’s network becomes less diverse following a death or 
retirement in their network (Fang et al., 2018), a decrease in audit quality following the death of an audit committee 
member (Intintoli et al., 2018), and an increase in the cost of borrowing following the death of an independent director 
(Intintoli et al., 2019).  
9 On average, there is about 8% connection loss following the death of independent director(s).  
10 Our death dummy is defined similarly to that of Intintoli et al. (2018), who studies the effect of deaths of audit 
committee members on firms’ audit quality.  
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One of the pre-conditions of any DiD analysis is that the outcome variable should be 
following parallel trends in both the treatment and control groups so that changes in the gap 
between groups following board member death is not simply due to converging or diverging 
trends. Panel A of Table 5 shows the balancing properties of the treatment and matched control 
group prior to the treatment. We have identified 506 firms in the treatment group that had a death 
of an independent director on the board, 497 of which we were successfully matched to a control 
firm.  The balancing results show that the treated and control firms are comparable with respect to 
the matching variables prior to the treatment that satisfies the parallel trend assumption as 
mentioned in Roberts and Whited (2012). Further, the balancing properties suggest the matching 
process has eliminated major differences between the treatment and control groups. This 
elimination of differences in levels is likely to extend, on average, to differences in trends, and so 
changes from pre-period to the post-period could be plausibly related to exogenous loss of 
connection by the death of independent director(s). 
Panel B of Table 5 reports the regression results in the propensity-score-matched sample. 
Column 1 reports the cross-sectional difference in firms’ CSR in the year of death. The firms with 
the death of independent directors see a decline in CSR compared to firms without a death, 
although the difference is not significant controlling for all the covariates (lagged by one year). 
This implies there is no immediate effect of the independent director’s death on firms’ CSR 
practices. However, CSR practices are highly persistent, and so we extend our analysis beyond the 
current year and estimate the effect for multiple years.  
In Column 2,11 we estimate the regression coefficient for Death_dum by comparing the 
treatment and control group (i.e., treatment - control) between one-year post-shock and one-year 
pre-shock (one-year post - one-year pre) while controlling for firm-specific determinants of CSR 
lagged by one year. There is a negative and significant difference between the two groups in two 
periods, suggesting that CSR performance declines due to the death of an independent director.  
 
11 Note that observation numbers change from column to column in this table. This change occurs for several reasons. 
First, as the sample window changes, some firms drop out for being too near the beginning or end of the sample. 
Second, some models include all pre- and post-years, whereas others are more limited. Third, the test in Column 2 is 
performed at a different observation level compared with the tests used for the other columns. Fourth, the final columns 
in the table use different methods entirely, leading to observations being either successfully matched or dropped for 
missing data. 
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Prior research shows that CSR spending represents a significant cost affecting the 
profitability in the short run, but its benefits are usually visible in the long run (Deng et al., 2013; 
Edmans, 2011). Therefore, in addition to reporting the effect of a change in CSR in the short run, 
in Column 3, we extend our analysis by comparing treatment and control between all post- and all 
pre-shock years (post years - pre years). The estimated coefficient in Column 3 is negative and 
significant and higher than the one period effect, suggesting that over a period of time, a firm’s 
CSR performance tends to decline due to the death of an independent director.  
One potential caveat of this analysis is that there could be time invariant unobserved firm 
differences between treatment and control groups that could bias our results in Columns 2 and 3. 
To address this concern, we re-estimate Column 3 with a firm fixed effect in Column 4. Using 
firm fixed effects ensures that the DiD variation being isolated is purely based on pre-post 
differences within the firm.12 The coefficient of Death_dum in Column 4 is negative and 
significant at the 5% level, which is consistent with the results that did not include firm fixed 
effects. Over a period of time, there is about a 27% decline in CSR score for firms that see a 
treatment compared to a control group. Although the coefficient magnitude is smaller in the case 
of firm fixed effect model compared to Column 3, it is still economically and statistically 
significant. Overall, we find strong support for our hypothesis that board connections positively 
affect a firm’s CSR and that a decline in the board’s connections reduces firms’ CSR performance.  
The decline in firms’ CSR due to the death of an independent director plausibly could be 
an artifact of specific matching schemes or a specific way of defining CSR. We especially analyze 
additional robustness tests to address such concerns. In Column 5 of Panel B, we use an alternative 
matching strategy to match the treated and control firms based on firm-level controls only. For this 
analysis, we use log(Assets), Leverage, ROA, Cash/asset, Dividend/asset, Tobin's Q, Firm age, 
Industry, and Year as matching criteria. All other matching procedures remained the same. In un-
tabulated results, we confirm that the treated and control group are indistinguishable before the 
shock under the alternative matching criteria. We re-estimate the regression model in Column 4 
 
12 In our baseline regression model, we do not include a firm fixed effect model because of strong autocorrelation in 
CSR and relatively little within-firm variation over time. However, in the difference-in-differences analysis, we expect 
a shock to CSR as a result of the death of independent directors, providing enough within-firm variation to justify the 
use of firm fixed effects. 
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with new matching criteria and our main DiD coefficient Death_dum is still negative and 
significant.  
In our second robustness check, we use an alternative definition of CSR following 
Adhikary (2016), who defines CSR as the difference between the strengths and concerns using 
community, diversity, environment, and human rights as components of CSR, which is different 
from what we used in our baseline regression. Using different components to define CSR, we want 
to check whether the DiD results are sensitive to the component-specific definition of CSR. For 
this robustness check, we followed the same matching criteria used in the baseline model (Column 
4). The results of the firm fixed effect model with the alternative definition (CSR score2) as 
indicated in Column 6 show that our main inference remains the same.  
We continued with our baseline matching criteria and in a third robustness check, we used 
another alternative definition (CSR score3) of CSR, per Lins et al. (2017). They defined CSR by 
scaling the strengths or concerns of CSR by the maximum number of strengths or concerns criteria 
possible in each category to account for inconsistencies in estimated strength and weakness of each 
category of CSR in each year by KLD. For this analysis we followed the same five categories to 
estimate CSR score as in our baseline regression, so the only difference here is the actual 
estimation of CSR. The result reported in Column 7 shows that there is a negative and statistically 
significant decline in CSR of treated firms relative to control following death.  
Collectively, our main results are robust to different matching schemes and alternative 
definitions of CSR. In two of the three robustness checks, the economic significance of the 
coefficient of interest is comparable to our baseline DiD result. In our third robustness 
specification, the economic magnitude is smaller compared to the baseline DiD result, which could 
be attributable to scaling differences in the estimation of CSR.    
Therefore, leveraging on our identification strategy, our baseline and robustness results 
suggest that an exogenous negative shock to a firm’s connectivity reduces the firm’s CSR 
performance. Overall, our findings suggest board connectedness matters for a firm’s CSR 
performance and confirms that the results are unlikely to be driven by endogeneity concerns.  
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4.2.3 Additional testing for reverse causality  
Our previous sections show consistency in results from two-stage regression analysis and 
difference-in-differences analysis using independent directors’ death as a quasi-natural 
experiment. The following three additional analyses provide evidence on whether reverse causality 
is driving our results.   
We closely follow Larcker et al. (2013) and Schabus (2018) and restrict our sample to those 
firms whose board remains the same from the prior year to the current year (i.e. constant board). 
When we restrict the sample of firms with a constant board then any change in the board 
connections must be due to changes in director’s external connectivity to other firms or changes 
in the boards of other companies the firm is connected to. Therefore, for the sample of firms with 
constant board structure, the changes in the focal firm’s board centrality are exogenous in nature 
and depend on the decisions of other firms. In Table 6, Column 1, shows the case of constant board 
structure. As anticipated the number of observations drops quite significantly. However, even then 
our main variable of interest (Q(N-score)) is positive and significant at the 1% level. The estimated 
coefficient is also close to the estimated coefficient in the base model suggesting that the results 
are robust to endogeneity concerns, especially reverse causality.  
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
We implement two additional empirical estimation strategies (outlined in Faleye et al. 
(2014), Faleye (2007) and Cheng (2008)) to address concerns related to reverse causality. First, 
we regress a firm’s CSR score on the third lag of the board’s connections, since the historical 
values are largely predetermined. Past employment connections occur long before the firm’s 
current CSR policies, making it harder to construct a reverse causality story in which past board 
connections are driven by a firm’s successful current CSR decisions. All the remaining explanatory 
variables are lagged by one year to maintain conformity with the base model. To avoid the 
endogenous relationship between board connectivity and CSR we further require that the board 
composition (i.e. assuming constant board) remains the same from the prior year to the current 
year. As in Column 2 of Table 6, we find a positive relationship between lagged board connection 
and current CSR activities, which implies that our results are unlikely to suffer from reverse 
causality problems.  
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Second, we include lagged values of the dependent variable as additional controls in our 
baseline model. The justification for adding lagged values of the dependent variable is that firms’ 
spending nature on CSR activities is quite sticky, and past CSR performance significantly 
determines firms’ present CSR performance (Habib and Hasan, 2016). One of the downsides of 
this approach is that including the lagged values of the dependent variable absorbs much of the 
variation in the data. One of the advantages of this estimation, as reported in Faleye et al. (2014), 
is that it addresses both unobserved heterogeneity and reverse causality problems. We continue 
with the constant board composition assumption to further reduce the chances that results are 
driven by endogeneity. We find a positive significant relation between firms’ CSR performance 
and board connections (Column 3). Overall, these results suggest that our findings are unlikely to 
be attributable to reverse causality.   
4.3. Other robustness tests  
In the previous section, we addressed concerns related to the endogenous part of the 
relationship between board connections and the firm’s CSR performance. Besides endogeneity, 
our results could also be sensitive to several other factors such as the definition of CSR, estimation 
of board connectivity, selection of time period, and so on. We report additional robustness 
checking in the following section.  
First, we check whether our results are sensitive to the CSR definition and estimation 
period. We present the results in Table 7, Panel A. The CSR definition used in our baseline model 
includes five dimensions: diversity, community, environment, employee, and product. Several 
papers have excluded product (Servaes and Tamayo, 2013) and employee (Edmans, 2011) and 
included human rights. Following Adhikari (2016), we estimate a new CSR score2, including 
community, environment, diversity, and human rights. The results in Column 1 show that our 
measure of board connectivity is positive and significant. Another potential concern in the 
estimation of CSR using the KLD database is the maximum number of strengths and concerns 
could vary over time, which could lead to inconsistencies. Following Lins et al. (2017), we 
construct a new CSR score3 and regress it on board connectivity, as reported in Column 2. Our 
main finding remains unchanged. The positive relationship between board connectedness and 
firms’ CSR performance could be possibly stronger, especially during the financial crisis because 
of firms’ need to build trust (Lins et al., 2017). To mitigate any concerns that our results are driven 
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by the financial crisis, we exclude 2008–2009 from our estimation, and our main results remain 
robust (Column 3).  
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
Second, we check whether our findings are the same when we define the network measure 
differently. Panel B of Table 7 presents the results. For this analysis, we develop an alternative 
measure of overall connectedness following Akbas et al. (2016). We first use the first principal 
component of all the centrality measures (degree, betweenness, eigenvector), and then regress the 
first principal component on firm size, board size, firm age, year dummy, and industry dummy. 
The residual of the regression is used as an overall board connectivity measure. Using the 
orthogonalized version of the individual and aggregate network measure (PC1_resid) we find a 
positive association between board connectivity and the firm’s CSR performance. Our result 
remains robust to the use of this alternative aggregate network measure.13 
Third, we check whether our results are sensitive to other estimation methods. One could 
argue our industry and year fixed effects might not adequately control for any confounding effects 
from contemporaneous changes at the industry level. To mitigate this concern, we include 
industry-by-year fixed effects to account for time-varying industry-level characteristics. In Panel 
C, we present the results with the definition of CSR score used in the baseline model, along with 
two alternative definitions: CSR score2 and CSR score3. Two important things emerge: our 
baseline results continue to hold, and the coefficient estimates are similar for all three definitions 
of CSR score. These results support our original analysis. 
 There was an initial reason to be concerned that our basic findings were an artifact of 
identification issues, reverse causality, omitted variable bias, measurement issues, sample study 
period, and modeling choices. However, we have implemented a battery of robustness tests and 
failed to find evidence that any of these issues can explain the original results.  
 
13 In the CSR literature, board size is a common control variable. Our network measure is at the board level, so 
including board size introduces collinearity (Spearman’s rank correlation = 0.54). The network literature suggests a 
few different ways to account for board size when using a composite network measure (see Akbas et al., 2016; Larcker 
et al., 2013; Ferris et al., 2019; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). However, in an unreported table, we find that including 
board size as an additional control does not change our baseline findings.  
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Our next cross-sectional analysis aims to explore possible situations in which board 
connections improve firms’ CSR performance and the channel(s) that drive the effect.  
 5. Channel analysis  
According to resource dependence theory, board members bring strategic resources, such 
as knowledge, expertise, and access to information from key constituents (suppliers, buyers, social 
groups), which enables them to provide advice to the management. Social network theory suggests 
that board connections can influence economic outcomes in two possible ways: information 
(Bjørnskov and Sønderskov, 2013) and influence (Adler and Kwon, 2002). Also, according to 
Mace (1971), independent directors with more important connections can have more information 
as well as more influence, which gives them more power. The presence of a powerful independent 
director(s) also makes the board powerful, which can affect economic outcomes. This leads to the 
question of whether the effect of the board connections on CSR is driven by an information 
advantage or influence effect of network.  
5.1. Information advantage channel 
We begin this section by exploring possible ways the information advantage of board 
connectedness may lead to improvements in firms’ CSR performance. Resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) predicts that connections to diverse groups allow individuals 
to access information (Hillman et al., 1999). We posit that better access to the firm- or industry-
specific information by the independent directors through a diverse network could help a 
connected board develop better awareness and engagement of CSR for the firm. Prior literature 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983; Boone et al., 2007; Coles et al., 2008) shows that a firm’s preference for 
certain types of independent directors may be motivated by their ability to access information from 
a wide array of people, which could benefit the firm. As originally proposed by Boone et al. (2007), 
the scope of operation hypothesis states that the information advantage of directors would be more 
valuable to certain types of firms such as complex firms or firms that have advisory needs. In such 
firms, we expect a stronger effect of board connectedness on CSR. 
To investigate the informational role of the network, we define two proxies: (1) Complexity 
(following Coles et al., 2008, 2012; Klein, 1998), which is a factor score (i.e., a linear combination 
of standard normal values) of four proxy variables for complexity. The proxy variables are the 
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scope of a firm’s operations (i.e., diversified across products markets), firm’s size, firm’s age, and 
the extent of a firm’s reliance on external capital (i.e., higher leverage). (2) Advisory-focused board 
is an indicator variable that equals 1 if the majority of the independent directors serve on a 
finance/investment/strategy committee and/or the executive committee (Faleye et al., 2011). Table 
8 reports the regression results of the effect of board connections on the firm’s CSR performance 
for complex firms and for advisory-focused boards. As board connections could be potentially 
endogenous, we use the same instruments (Fraction_indep_MBA and Sector_indep) to treat the 
endogeneity in Q(N-score) and in the interaction terms. 
[Insert Table 8 about here] 
Following Coles et al. (2008) and Boone et al. (2007), we argue that since complex firms 
have a greater need for specialized information/knowledge, well-networked directors can perform 
more advisory role, leverage more on the informational advantage of network, and contribute more 
in improving firm’s strategic non-operational policies like CSR. If information advantage is the 
underlying channel, then we will expect to see a positive impact of board connectedness on firms’ 
CSR performance for complex firms. Consistent with our prediction, we find that the interaction 
term Complexity* Q(N-score) is positive and significant in Column 3.14 This implies that the 
positive effect of board connectedness on CSR performance is more pronounced in complex firms. 
Our finding extends the literature on the advisory role of the board. Prior literature show (Coles et 
al. (2008) and Linck et al. (2008)), size of the board is positively associated with financial 
performance for complex firms that have greater advising needs. We complement their findings 
by documenting that, board connectedness is positively associated with social performance for 
complex firms.  Therefore, the effect of advising goes beyond financial outcomes.  
To shed more light on the information mechanism of board connectedness, following 
Faleye et al., 2011 and Coles et al., 2008, we identify firms with more advisory-focused boards 
(i.e., majority of the independent directors are assigned to advisory-focused committees such as 
finance/investment/strategic committee or executive committee). If information advantage is the 
underlying channel, we will then expect that as firms become more connected, an advisory-focused 
 
14 For both interaction models, the Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic is greater than the conventional threshold, and 
Hansen’s J-statistic cannot reject the null hypothesis. We thank an anonymous reviewer for suggesting the use of 2SLS 
with instrumental variables in the interaction model.  
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board will be able to perform better, leading to a higher CSR score for those firms. Consistent with 
our prediction, we find that the interaction term Advisory-focused board * Q(N-score) is positive 
and significant in Column 6.15 This result implies that the effect of board connectedness in 
increasing CSR performance is stronger in firms with an advisory-focused board. We complement 
the findings of Faleye et al. (2011) by showing that social performance increases with board 
connectedness when there is a greater need for advising. In sum, our interaction analysis finds 
empirical support for resource dependence theory which suggests board connectedness facilitates 
communication of information to/from external parties (Hillman et al., 1999), which in turn 
reduces information asymmetry and enhances the advisory ability of the board.  
In an additional cross-sectional analysis, we explore other situations when firm’s social 
performance could be benefitted from boards connections. Duchin et al. (2010) suggest that 
independent directors are less effective in improving corporate governance of the firms when 
information acquisition costs are high. Therefore, the information benefit of the network should 
be more pronounced when it is costly to acquire information. Typically, information opacity is 
higher in firms that are poorly governed (Govscore), have high stock return volatility (Highvol), 
low market capitalization (Lowmcap), and low institutional ownership (Lowinst).16 Hence, we 
expect the effect of board connectedness on CSR performance should be more pronounced in such 
firms as well-connected directors reduce the information gap between the board and external 
parties as resource dependence theory postulates. Consistent with this intuition, in Table 9, we find 
that in such firms, when information acquisition costs are high, incremental information advantage 
resulting from high board connections increases firms’ CSR performances.  
 [Insert Table 9 about here]  
The previous analysis reveals possible situations when board connectedness improves 
firms’ CSR, however, in the following complementary analysis, we examine who these 
independent directors are connected to and how diversity in boards’ network connections facilitate 
the transmission of information to improve different components of CSR score. 17 
 
15 Summary statistics show that mostly large, profitable, older, leveraged, and dividend-paying firms tend to construct 
advisory-focused boards. 
16 For definitions of the variables used in the sub-sample analysis, see Table A1 in the appendix. 
17 We thank both anonymous reviewers for suggesting this additional analysis.  
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Prior literature shows that diverse network connections improve access to different types 
of information, knowledge, and opportunities. Burt (2004) suggests that opinions, ideas, and 
thinking tend to cluster more within than between groups. Diversity in network connections should 
promote greater information flow, allowing individuals to gain new insights, bringing diverse 
perspectives and novel approaches (Jackson, 2010, Burt, 2004). The finance literature shows that 
boards’ different types of networks significantly influence firms’ performance (Larcker et al., 
2013); compensation practices (Wong et al., 2015); and earnings management (Chiu et al., 2012). 
Staurt and Yim (2010) find that board members’ social networks influence which companies 
become targets in a change-of-control transaction. Cohen et al. (2008, 2010) argue that sensitive 
information can be disseminated through educational networks. Diversity in boards’ networks is 
especially important for CSR. The firm’s decision to engage in certain CSR activities could be 
motivated by independent directors with diverse connections. As diversity in a network increases, 
independent directors’ interactions with diverse groups of people expose them to different ideas, 
values, and knowledge. Collectively, the information acquisition by the independent directors 
through a heterogeneous network could bring in information value to firms’ CSR decision-making. 
For this analysis, we construct several measures to quantify diversity in network 
connections. Using information from BoardEx for each firm-year, we construct Charity_pct as the 
average percentage of connections to top-25 charitable firms (in the United States) by the 
independent directors in the board;18 Female_pct as the average percentage of connections to 
female directors by the independent director in the board; Non-polluting_pct as one minus the 
average percentage of connections to directors in polluting industries by the independent director 
in the board;19 Union_pct as the average percentage of connections to directors in union intensive 
industries by the independent director in the board;20 and R&D_pct as the average percentage of 
 
 
18 We obtain data on corporate giving from the Chronicle of Philanthropy (https://www.philanthropy.com/), a 
magazine that ranks most charitable U.S. firms based on their total corporate giving (cash and product). We collected 
the top quartile of the firms for each year in our sample period.  
19 We define polluting industries as those listed in BoardEx as Chemicals, Electricity, Engineering & Machinery, 
Forestry & Paper, Mining, Oil & Gas, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Steel & Other Metals, Transport, and 
Utilities – Other. We closely follow Gallego-Alvarez et al. (2015) to define polluting industries. 
20 Industrywide information on union coverage comes from http://www.unionstats.com/. For our sample period, we 
estimated industrywide union coverage, and the top-five unionized industries are mapped to one of the following 
BoardEx sectors: Education, Transport, Construction & Building Materials, Electricity, Utilities - Other, Aerospace 
& Defence, Electronic & Electrical Equipment, Engineering & Machinery, Software & Computer Services, Steel & 
Other Metals, Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Forestry & Paper, Containers & Packaging, Tobacco, 
Publishing, Telecommunication Services, and Health, Media & Entertainment.  
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connections to directors in R&D-intensive industry by the independent director in the board.21 
Diversity in network connections is then sorted into quintiles. To understand how diversity in a 
board’s connections affects firms’ CSR practices, we regress CSR components on board network 
diversity measures. Table 10 reports the results. 
 [Insert Table 10 about here]  
In all the regression specifications, we control for overall board connectedness to 
potentially tease out the effect of network size while analyzing the effect of network type. 
Consistent with social learning theory, we find that all the board network diversity measures to are 
positively associated with CSR score components. For example, in Column 1, boards in the top 
quintile of connection to external firms that are consistently ranked among the top-25 most 
charitable firms in the United States tend to improve in Comm_net, holding other things constant. 
A prior study by Brown et al. (2006) finds evidence that corporate giving has a positive impact on 
corporate valuation, and so board connections to these top charitable firms help managers of other 
firms follow the corporate giving practices that can improve the firm’s community CSR score, 
although there could be agency motivations as mentioned by Masulis and Reza (2015).  
The diversity score (Div_net) improves by 1.2 points for the firms in the top quintile of 
connections with external female directors compared with the bottom quintile of connections with 
external female directors. This result is consistent with prior literature that women are more 
committed to social causes than are men (Adams and Funk, 2012), and the presence of female 
directors is negatively associated with information opacity (Upadhyay and Zeng, 2014).  
Similarly, information sharing between independent directors and other directors working 
in non-polluting industries also positively improves environmental scores (i.e. Env_net in Column 
3). This finding is consistent with that of Kock et al. (2012), who find that pro-shareholder 
 
21 Industrywide information on R&D intensity comes from https://nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/report. The 
National Science Board publishes science and engineering indicators, and chapter 4 of the report lists the top-5 R&D-
intense industries. We use the NACIS classification and manually map industries to BoardEx to determine our R&D-
intensive sectors. Possible sectors include Oil & Gas, Chemicals, Pharmaceuticals and Biotechnology, Household 
Products, Software & Computer Services, Information Technology Hardware, Electronic & Electrical Equipment, 
Automobiles & Parts, Aerospace & Defense, Diversified Industrials, Engineering & Machinery, Transport, Software 
& Computer Services, Telecommunication Services, Media & Entertainment, Publishing, Media & Entertainment, 
and Business Services. 
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independent directors tend to improve firms’ environmental performances. Interestingly, in 
Column 4, we find that the firms that are in the top quintile of connections to unionized industries 
tend to outperform in employment-related CSR score (Emp_net). Independent directors’ 
connections to other directors working in unionized environments facilitate the exchange of 
information that can assist the managers in improving employee relations within the firm and 
improve their employment-related score. A prior study by Balsmeier et al. (2017) shows a positive 
association between board independence and a firm’s patents and citations. Our results in Column 
5 shows that boards with a higher percentage of connections (i.e., top quintile) to directors in R&D-
intense industries tend to improve the firm’s Pro_Net compared to firms in the bottom quintile of 
connections.  
Therefore, diversity in boards network connections facilitates connections to a stratum of 
professionals within their network who can share/disseminate valuable information, ideas, and 
experiences from related to specific issues that might help managers improve strengths or mitigate 
concerns relating to different kinds of social or operational performance. 
In summary, our findings provide an abundance of evidence in favor of the information 
advantage of the network and support the idea that well-connected boards have better access to 
information that they pass on to managers who use it to make better CSR decisions.  
5.2. Information versus influence channel  
In the preceding section, we have explored one of the two possible ways of board 
connections that can affect firms’ CSR performance. It could be argued that the positive 
association is attributed due to the influence of a highly connected board. Social network theory 
suggests that as boards’ social network increases, their collective social capital also increases, 
which gives the board access to more information (Bjørnskov and Sønderskov, 2013) as well as 
more influence (Adler and Kwon, 2002). That is, in addition to information, social capital allows 
directors to gain the power to influence others around them. In support of this view, Fogel et al. 
(2014) show that more powerful independent directors are associated with less value-destroying 
M&A, less free cash flow retention, less earnings management, and more CEO accountability, 
suggesting that they are better at disciplining managers. Intintoli et al. (2018) find that the 
connectedness of independent, non-co-opted audit committee members is associated with lower 
earnings management and greater conservatism. In sum, boards have influence in corporate 
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decisions, and CSR is one of the voluntary decisions made by the board, so it could be possible 
that the association is merely driven by the influence of the board.  
On the other hand, a powerful CEO is likely to play an instrumental role. Prior literature 
suggests that managers engage in socially responsible activities for their own self-interest at the 
expense of shareholders. Barnea and Rubin (2010) show that managers overinvest in CSR for their 
private benefits. They find that, as insider ownership increases, CSR declines because the 
managers bear a larger cost associated with this value-reducing activity. Surroca and Tribo (2008), 
find in an international context, that firms with more managerial entrenchment engage more in 
CSR activities. Masulis and Reza (2015) show that corporate donations serve CEOs’ interests and 
reduce shareholders’ valuation of firm cash holdings. Petrenko et al. (2016) show that CEO 
narcissism has positive effects on CSR, suggesting that CSR initiatives may result from leaders’ 
personal needs for attention and image reinforcement. More recently, Chen et al. (2020) show that 
CSR is driven by agency motives and tax avoidance considerations, suggesting that managers “do 
good with other people’s money.” Finally, Withisuphakorn and Jiraporn (2019) show that when 
managers bear greater costs of CSR, through their equity stakes, they reduce CSR engagements.  
Therefore, influential boards and powerful CEOs can play important roles in CSR policy. 
If our proxy of board connectedness does not represent information advantage of the network, then 
it must be capturing the influence of the board network. Influence is more likely to be present as a 
mechanism for how board connections influence CSR when the CEO is less powerful. Under this 
assumption, we examine the effect of board connectedness on CSR under weak and strong CEOs, 
using the difference between them as a measure of the influence effect. We use two proxies: (1) 
CEO chair duality (Morse et al., 2011; Fracassi and Tate, 2012) and (2) Co-option (Coles et al., 
2014). CEO chair duality is a dummy variable that equals 1 when the CEO of the firm is also the 
chairman of the board. Co-option is defined as the percentage of independent directors who joined 
the board after the CEO assumed the office, scaled by the board size.  
In Table 11, we report the results using CEO chair duality (Columns 1–3), and Co-option 
(Columns 4–6) as proxies for CEO power and board power. For the first analysis to check the 
predominance of the influence channel, we identify firms with weak CEO power. Our first proxy 
for CEO power is CEO chair duality. To identify firms with less powerful CEOs, we define 
Non_dual as one minus CEO chair duality. Our estimation strategy involves using instrumental 
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variables two-stage least squares regressions model to correct for endogeneity concerns. Our main 
variable of interest is the interaction term Non_dual * Q(N-score). If the interaction is positive and 
significant, then the impact of board connections is stronger in firms with weaker CEOs, implying 
that the positive association between board connections and CSR is driven by the board’s 
incremental influence. An insignificant coefficient will suggest that the observed positive 
association is not due to the board’s incremental influence, leaving the information effect as the 
main driver. The interaction term in the second-stage regression in Column 3 is negative and not 
statistically significant at conventional thresholds. This result indicates that the influence channel 
of the network does not explain the positive association between the board connections and CSR 
performance. Also, we find that the coefficient on Q(N-score) is positive and significant, showing 
an overall effect of board connectedness, consistent with the rest of the paper, and also implying 
that board connectedness has an information mechanism.  
For the second analysis, we identified firms with low co-option. These are the firms with 
strong board power and/or weak CEO power (relative to the board). Since the CEO was involved 
in their initial appointment, co-opted directors are more likely to show their loyalty to the CEO. 
Hence, a firm with a lower percentage of co-opted directors will be more independent from the 
CEO and thus will be more likely to enforce effective governance measures. We used industry 
median Co-option in each year to identify less co-opted boards. We define Lowco-option as the 
below-median firms that have relatively more powerful boards and vice versa. The interaction term 
(Lowco-option* Q(N-score)) in Column 6 indicates that there is no incremental advantage of the 
influence of board connectedness. Additionally, we find a positive and significant coefficient on 
Q(N-score) which implies that an information advantage of the network is present.     
In summary, using measures to proxy board power or CEO power, our interaction analysis 
suggests that the influence of the board or CEO is not the dominant channel that could potentially 
drive the positive and significant relation between board connectedness and firms’ CSR activities. 
If influence were dominant, we would expect that the effect of board connectedness would be 
stronger in weak-CEO firms, where both information and influence mechanisms are strong than 
in strong CEO firms, where only the information mechanism is strong. On the other hand, we find 
consistent support in favor of the information advantage of the network. Although we did not find 
support for the influence channel of the network in our sample, we would still interpret these results 
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with caution, recognizing that in reality, it is extremely difficult to isolate the information and 
influence effects of a network. 
6. Conclusions 
 In recent years, consumer consciousness has prompted companies to become more and 
more socially responsible. Externally connected directors can assist managers to cope with this 
pressure by sharing information, knowledge, and advice on the best practices of others in the 
industry. Despite the importance of independent directors’ social networks in a firm’s CSR 
performance, no prior studies have attempted to study the association between board 
connectedness and a firm’s CSR performance. Our paper aims to fill this gap in the literature. 
Whether well-connected directors are beneficial for a firm’s CSR performance is an 
empirical question. The resource dependence theory suggests that as firms hire more “resource-
rich” directors, more connections give directors greater access to information, reduce the 
information gap, and assist managers in adopting practices that can improve value-enhancing CSR. 
On the other hand, the agency view suggests the board of directors can offer a possible governance 
mechanism to mitigate wasteful CSR. Moreover, social network theory suggests well-connected 
boards could be more informative and influential hence be better at enforcing corporate 
governance. Therefore, well-networked boards not only get access to more information but also 
gain more influence or power and are most likely to enforce effective governance measures to 
reduce wasteful CSR. Since there are two opposing views of the effect of board connectedness on 
CSR performance, it is difficult ex-ante to predict what will be the effect of board connections on 
a firm’s CSR performance. 
Using an unbalanced panel of 16,477 firm-year observations for 2,820 publicly traded U.S. 
firms from 2002 to 2013, our results support the predictions from resource dependence theory. We 
find a positive association between board connectedness and CSR performance using individual 
and aggregate centrality measures. Also, we show that the results are not driven by any specific 
component of CSR. The market seems to reward firms with higher valuation when CSR activities 
are promoted by well-connected directors. This suggests that strongly connected boards foster 
value-enhancing CSR activities. 
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To address the potential endogeneity of the connected board’s effect on CSR, we report 
results from several robustness tests. Following prior literature, we use two instruments to treat 
board connectedness, and our results are consistent with those from an OLS regression. Second, 
in our quasi-natural experiment, we use an exogenous shock to the board’s external connections 
resulting from the deaths of independent directors. We show a robust decline in the firm’s CSR 
score following the deaths of independent directors, which suggests plausible causal relations 
between board connections and CSR. A battery of robustness tests rules out concerns related to 
identification, reverse causality, omitted variable bias, measurement issues, sample study period, 
and modeling choices.  
We then explore possible situations in which board connections improve firms’ CSR 
performance and the channel(s) that drive the effect. We find the positive associations between 
boards’ connections and CSR are more pronounced for complex firms and firms with advisory-
focused boards because these firms benefit from the critical resources, such as information, that 
well-connected directors provide. Also, we report that firms with poor governance and that have 
high stock market volatility, low market capitalization, and low institutional ownership tend to 
benefit from the director’s external connections, especially when information acquisition costs are 
high. In addition to the number of connections, we show that directors’ diverse external network 
connections (i.e. those they know) facilitate the transmission of information that can be pivotal for 
managers in improving specific components of CSR.  
An alternative explanation of our results could be the influence effect of the network. 
According to social networking theory, more connections could make the board more informative 
as well as more influential, i.e. powerful. Likewise, as prior studies suggest, a powerful CEO is 
likely to play an instrumental role in a firm’s CSR policies. If our proxy of board connectedness 
does not represent an information advantage of the network, then it must be capturing the influence 
of the board network. Influence is more likely to be present as a mechanism for how board 
connections influence CSR when the CEO is less powerful. Following this assumption, we 
examine the effect of board connectedness on CSR under weak and strong CEOs, using the 
difference between them as a measure of the influence effect. Our results find no support for the 
influence effect of the network, rather the results might suggest the predominance of an 
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information benefit of the network. We interpret this result cautiously because it is difficult to 
conclusively rule out the influence effect.  
Overall, our finding suggests that the access to information from external parties resulting 
from the network connections provides well-connected boards an informational advantage, which 
plays a dominant role in allowing a well-connected board to achieve higher social performance for 
the firm through strategic advising. 
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Appendix  
Table A1. Variable definitions. 
Variables Definition Source 
Dependent variable   
CSR score The net CSR score (total strengths minus total concerns) of a firm across the KLD’s 
five main social rating areas: community, diversity, environment, employee, and 
product 
KLD 
Explanatory variable   
Q(N-score) The quintile of N-score measure. Where N-score is the average of quintile rank of all 
three centrality measures by year   
BoardEx 
Network variables   
Q(Degree) The quintile ranking of the degree centrality measure by year BoardEx 
Q(Eigenvector) The quintile ranking of the eigenvector centrality measure by year BoardEx 
Q(Between) The quintile ranking of the between centrality measure by year BoardEx 
Q(Charity_pct)  The quintile ranking of the average percentage of connections to top U.S. charitable 
firms by the independent directors in the board for each firm-year 
BoardEx 
Q(Female_pct) The quintile ranking of the average percentage of connections to female directors by 
the independent directors in the board for each firm-year 
BoardEx 
Q(Non-polluting_pct) The quintile ranking of (1- average percentage of connections to polluting industries 
by the independent directors in the board for each firm-year) 
BoardEx 
Q(Union_pct) The quintile ranking of the average percentage of connections to unionized industries 
by the independent directors in the board for each firm-year 
BoardEx 
Q(R&D_pct) The quintile ranking of the average percentage of connections to R&D-intensive 
industries by independent directors in the board for each firm-year 
BoardEx 
PC1_resid PC1 is the first principal component of the all the centrality measure (degree, 
betweenness, eigenvector). PC1_resid is the residual from PC1 regressed on firm size, 
board size, firm size, the year dummy, and the industry dummy 
BoardEx 
Degree_resid The residual from regressing degree centrality on firm size, board size, firm size, the 
year dummy, and the industry dummy 
BoardEx 
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Eigen_resid The residual from regressing eigen centrality on firm size, board size, firm size, the 
year dummy, and the industry dummy 
BoardEx 
Between_resid The residual from regressing between centrality on firm size, board size, firm size, the 
year dummy, and the industry dummy 
BoardEx 
CSR variables   
CSR score2 The net CSR score (total strengths minus total concerns) of a firm across the KLD’s 
four rating areas: community, diversity, environment, and human rights, following 
Adhikary (2016) 
KLD 
CSR score3 An index of the net CSR score (scaled strengths minus scaled concerns). Scaled 
strengths (concerns) are computed by dividing the number of strengths (concerns) by 
the maximum possible strengths (concerns) in that category for each firm-year, 
following Lins et al. (2017) 
KLD 
Comm_net The difference of community strength and concerns KLD 
Div_net The difference of diversity strength and concerns KLD 
Env_net The difference of environment strength and concerns KLD 
Emp_net The difference of employment strength and concerns KLD 
Pro_net The difference of product strength and concerns KLD 
Total_strength The sum of strength scores from community, diversity, environment, employee, and 
product 
KLD 
Total_concerns The sum of concern scores from community, diversity, environment, employee, and 
product 
KLD 
Board variables   
Board independence The proportion of independent directors on a firm’s board of directors BoardEx 
Death_dum A dummy variable equal to 1 for firms when an independent director dies in any year 
and 0 otherwise 
BoardEx 
Advisory-focused board A dummy variable that equals 1 if the majority of independent directors serve on a 
finance/investment/strategy committee and/or an executive committee 
BoardEx 
Fraction_indep_MBA The percentage of independent directors with an MBA degree from an elite institution 
for each firm-year. We follow the definition of elite institutions from Useem and 
Karabel (1986) and Fang et al. (2018) 
BoardEx 
Sector_indep The average number of Fama-French (1997) industries in which independent 
directors worked in the past estimated for each firm-year based on the Fama-French 
48-industries classification 
BoardEx 
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Constant board A dummy variable that equals 1 if there is no change in board composition over two 
consecutive years 
BoardEx 
CEO variables   
CEO chair duality A dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is a chairman of the board and 0 otherwise BoardEx 
CEO network The natural log of the total network size of CEO +1 BoardEx 
Firm-specific variables   
log(Assets) The natural logarithm of total assets Compustat 
Leverage (Long-term debt + Debt in current liabilities)/total assets Compustat 
ROA Net income/total assets Compustat 
Cash/asset Total amount of cash/total asset Compustat 
log(Firm age) The natural logarithm of the difference between the observation year and listing year Compustat 
Dividend/asset Total cash dividend/total asset Compustat 
Tobin’s Q (Market value of common stock + total debt+ preferred stock-deferred taxes and 
investment tax credits)/Book value of assets 
Compustat 
Govscore The difference between corporate governance strength and concerns KLD 
Complexity A principal component factor of firm size, firm age, leverage, and the number of 
business segments. We calculate the factor score for each of the above proxies using 
the first principal component. For each firm-year observation, the complexity factor 
score is a linear combination of the standard normal values of the four proxy variables 
of complexity following Coles et al. (2008) 
Compustat, 
CRSP 
Info_cost  An index constructed by the size-adjusted ranking of analysts’ forecast dispersion, 
coverage, and  absolute forecast error, following Duchin et al. (2010) 
CRSP, IBES, 
Compustat 
Vol  The rolling 24-month standard deviation of a stock’s return CRSP 
Mcap  The monthly average market capitalization of a firm, where monthly market 
capitalization is the average daily market capitalization  
CRSP 
Co-option  The proportion of co-opted directors on a board (normalized by board size), where co-
opted directors are those independent directors who were appointed after a CEO 
assumed the position in the firm 
Obtained from  
Lalitha 
Naveen’s 
Website 
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Inst The percentage of the common share held by institutional ownership Spectrum 
Institutional 
13-F fillings  
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics. 
This table reports summary statistics for our final sample, which comprises 16,477 observations over 
the period 2002–2013. Table A1 in the appendix defines the variables and reports the data sources. 
  
 
Variable name Observations Mean SD p25 Median p75 Max Min 
CSR variables         
CSR score 16,477 -0.24 2.16 -2.0 0.0 1.0 8 -5 
CSR score2 16,477 0.01 1.81 -1.0 0.0 1.0 7 -4 
CSR score3 16,477 -0.22 0.56 -0.6 -0.3 0.0 1.8 -1.6 
Comm_net 16,477 0.05 0.44 0.0 0.0 0.0 2 -1 
Div_net 16,477 0.02 1.31 -1.0 0.0 1.0 4 -2 
Emp_net 16,477 -0.14 0.87 -1.0 0.0 0.0 4 -2 
Env_net 16,477 -0.02 0.78 0.0 0.0 0.0 3 -3 
Pro_net 16,477 -0.14 0.54 0.0 0.0 0.0 1 -2 
Total_strengths 16,477 1.30 2.17 0.0 0.0 2.0 11 0 
Total_concerns 16,477 1.53 1.52 0.0 1.0 2.0 7 0 
         
Network measures         
Q(N-score) 16,477 2.95 1.40 2.0 3.0 4.0 5 1 
Q(Degree) 16,477 2.76 1.49 1.0 3.0 4.0 5 1 
Q(Eigenvector) 16,477 3.03 1.42 2.0 3.0 4.0 5 1 
Q(Between) 16,477 2.98 1.48 1.0 3.0 4.0 5 1 
Q(Charity_pct)  16,477 1.27 1.00 1.0 1.0 1.0 5 1 
Q(Female_pct) 16,477 3.01 1.41 2.0 3.0 4.0 5 1 
Q(Non-polluting_pct) 14,936 2.97 1.40 2.0 3.0 4.0 5 1 
Q(Union_pct) 14,936 3.00 1.40 2.0 3.0 4.0 5 1 
Q(R&D_pct) 14,936 2.99 1.40 2.0 3.0 4.0 5 1 
PC1_resid 16,477 0.57 0.87 -0.1 0.5 1.1 3.7 -1.8 
Degree_resid 16,477 5.71 2.82 3.6 5.4 7.6 13 0.27 
Eigen_resid 16,477 0.03 0.05 -0.0 0.0 0.1 .18 -0.042 
Between_resid 16,477 0.00 0.00 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0049 -0.00072 
         
Board variables         
Board independence 16,477 0.82 0.09 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.94 0.56 
Death_dum 506 1 0      
Advisory-focused board 16,477 0.29 0.45 0.0 0.0 1.0 1 0 
Sector_indep  16,477 0.73 0.49 0.3 0.7 1.0 3.6 0 
Fraction_indep_MBA 16,320 0.18 0.16 0.0 0.2 0.3 1 0 
Constant_board 5,575 1 0      
Co-option 8,775 0.38 0.26 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.89 0 
Variable name     
  
  
CEO variables         
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CEO network 16,477 5.84 1.73 5.2 6.2 7.0 8.3 0 
CEO chair duality 16,477 0.66 0.47 0.0 1.0 1.0 1 0 
         
Firm-specific variables         
log(Assets) 16,477 7.16 1.62 6.0 7.0 8.2 11 3.7 
Leverage 16,477 0.22 0.20 0.0 0.2 0.3 0.93 0 
ROA 16,477 0.02 0.15 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.28 -0.82 
Cash/asset 16,477 0.13 0.14 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.72 0.00063 
Dividend/asset 16,477 0.01 0.02 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.15 0 
Tobin’s Q 16,477 1.72 1.35 0.9 1.3 2.0 8.3 0.39 
log(Firm age) 16,477 2.67 1.01 2.1 2.7 3.5 4.4 0 
Complexity 16,405 0.43 0.92 -0.2 0.3 1.0 4.5 -3 
Govscore 16,477 -0.28 0.73 -1.0 0.0 0.0 2 -4 
Info_cost  13,663 44.34 22.85 25.3 44.0 62.7 96 1.7 
Vol  14,465 0.08 0.03 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.14 0.057 
Mcap  14,454 14.16 1.50 13.1 14.0 15.0 18 11 
Inst 12,953 0.77 0.21 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.1 0.026 
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Table 2 
Board connectedness and firms’ CSR performance. 
This table reports the results of board connectedness on firm’s CSR performance using an OLS 
regression. Our sample includes U.S. publicly traded firms (excluding the financial industry) 
from 2002 to 2013.  The dependent variable in all models is CSR score, which is estimated using 
KLD data. The main independent variable of interest is Q(N-score), which quintile ranking of 
N-score. Where N-score is defined as the average of quintile ranking of all three centrality 
measures by year. See section 3.2 for a description of the individual and aggregate centrality 
measures. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. All the independent variables are 
lagged by one year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized 
at both the 1% and 99% levels. Robust t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 
0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
     
 CSR score CSR score CSR score CSR score 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Q(Degree) 0.0964***    
 (3.91)    
Q(Eigenvector)  0.1252***   
  (4.72)   
Q(Between)   0.0892***  
   (4.01)  
Q(N-score)    0.1158*** 
    (4.47) 
CEO network 0.0942*** 0.0937*** 0.0960*** 0.0932*** 
 (5.26) (5.24) (5.35) (5.20) 
CEO chair duality 0.0436 0.0444 0.0449 0.0441 
 (0.71) (0.72) (0.73) (0.72) 
Board independence 0.2115 0.2018 0.2251 0.1430 
 (0.60) (0.57) (0.64) (0.40) 
log(Assets) 0.4374*** 0.4419*** 0.4443*** 0.4330*** 
 (10.43) (10.76) (10.73) (10.34) 
Leverage -0.9344*** -0.9285*** -0.9239*** -0.9282*** 
 (-5.39) (-5.37) (-5.32) (-5.36) 
ROA 0.1974 0.1925 0.1908 0.2064 
 (1.34) (1.31) (1.29) (1.40) 
Cash/asset 0.3930* 0.4107** 0.4113** 0.3986* 
 (1.91) (2.00) (2.00) (1.94) 
Dividend/asset 4.2726*** 4.2199*** 4.3196*** 4.2510*** 
 (2.74) (2.71) (2.76) (2.73) 
Tobin’s Q 0.2247*** 0.2259*** 0.2257*** 0.2241*** 
 (9.42) (9.50) (9.47) (9.39) 
log(Firm age) 0.0550 0.0575 0.0538 0.0555 
 (1.53) (1.60) (1.50) (1.55) 
Constant -5.8080*** -6.1052*** -5.9107*** -5.8387*** 
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 (-8.93) (-9.71) (-9.08) (-9.01) 
Observations 16,477 16,477 16,477 16,477 
R-squared 0.1800 0.1802 0.1797 0.1805 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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Table 3 
Board connectedness and CSR components. 
This table reports the effect of overall board connectedness on CSR components (Panel A) and 
CSR Strengths and Concerns (Panel B). Our sample includes U.S. publicly traded firms (excluding 
the financial industry) from 2002 to 2013. In Panel A, we report regression results on five separate 
components i.e. Comm_net, Div_net, Env_net, Emp_net and Pro_net. In Panel B, we report 
regression results on Total_strengths and Total_concerns. The main independent variable of 
interest is Q(N-score), which quintile ranking of N-score. Where N-score is defined as the average 
of quintile ranking of all three centrality measures by year. Table A1 in the appendix defines all 
variables. All the independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are clustered at 
the firm level. All variables are winsorized at both the 1% and 99% levels. Robust t-statistics 
appear in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
Panel A: Board connectedness and CSR components 
 Comm_net Div_net Env_net Emp_net Pro_net 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q(N-score) 0.0102* 0.1068*** 0.0149** -0.0120 -0.0069 
 (1.91) (7.51) (2.22) (-1.18) (-1.17) 
CEO network 0.0113*** 0.0513*** 0.0113* 0.0191*** 0.0034 
 (3.57) (5.37) (1.83) (2.93) (0.85) 
CEO chair duality 0.0195 0.0730** -0.0005 -0.0439* -0.0047 
 (1.62) (2.23) (-0.02) (-1.75) (-0.33) 
Board independence -0.0178 0.4952** -0.1356 -0.1025 -0.0824 
 (-0.27) (2.46) (-1.12) (-0.73) (-0.96) 
log(Assets) 0.0649*** 0.3440*** 0.0439*** 0.0984*** -0.0985*** 
 (7.30) (18.69) (2.91) (6.38) (-10.61) 
Leverage -0.1073*** -0.4765*** -0.0627 -0.3103*** -0.0105 
 (-3.46) (-5.20) (-1.12) (-4.58) (-0.24) 
ROA -0.0514** -0.2921*** 0.1298*** 0.2177*** 0.1795*** 
 (-2.01) (-3.52) (2.98) (3.32) (5.00) 
Cash/asset 0.0128 0.3717*** 0.0379 0.0972 -0.0942** 
 (0.34) (3.26) (0.66) (1.27) (-2.08) 
Dividend/asset 1.2507*** 3.8723*** 0.8079* 0.0237 -1.4191*** 
 (3.67) (4.83) (1.80) (0.04) (-3.19) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0289*** 0.0890*** 0.0385*** 0.0701*** 0.0023 
 (5.92) (7.09) (6.35) (7.40) (0.45) 
log(Firm age) -0.0020 0.0815*** -0.0348*** 0.0284** -0.0110 
 (-0.28) (4.25) (-2.60) (2.19) (-1.25) 
Constant -0.7574*** -3.8066*** -1.0228* -0.6166* 0.2860 
 (-5.38) (-8.10) (-1.76) (-1.83) (0.78) 
Observations 16,477 16,477 16,477 16,477 16,477 
R-squared 0.0872 0.3663 0.1124 0.1498 0.1228 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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                    Panel B: Board connectedness, CSR strengths, and concerns 
 
 Total_strengths Total_concerns 
Variables (1) (2) 
Q(N-score) 0.1154*** 0.0001 
 (5.30) (0.01) 
CEO network 0.0773*** -0.0208* 
 (5.52) (-1.80) 
Other controls Yes Yes 
Observations 16,477 16,477 
R-squared 0.4358 0.2815 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm 
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Table 4 
Board connectedness and firms’ CSR performance: Instrumental variables approach. 
This table reports the results of two-stage least squares regressions using two instruments. Our 
sample includes U.S. publicly traded firms (excluding the financial industry) from 2002 to 2013. 
Our first instrument is the fraction of independent directors who have attended MBA programs 
at an elite institution (Fraction_indep_MBA). Our second instrument is the number of Fama-
French 48 industries an independent director (Sector_indep) has worked for in the past. The 
dependent variable is CSR score, which is estimated from KLD data. Column 1 shows the first-
stage regression and Column 2 shows the second-stage regression results. The main independent 
variable of interest is Q(N-score), which quintile ranking of N-score. Where N-score is defined 
as the average of quintile ranking of all three centrality measures by year. Table A1 in the 
appendix defines all variables. All the independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at both the 1% and 99% levels. 
Robust t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
 First-stage Second-stage 
 Q(N-score)  CSR score 
Variables (1) (2) 
Fraction_indep_MBA 0.4525***  
 (5.39)  
Sector_indep 1.5560***  
 (44.12)  
Q(N-score)  0.2000*** 
  (3.91) 
CEO network 0.0324*** 0.0866*** 
 (4.37) (4.74) 
CEO chair duality -0.0321 0.0468 
 (-1.11) (0.75) 
Board independence 3.4650*** -0.1983 
 (22.67) (-0.50) 
log(Assets) 0.2010*** 0.3980*** 
 (16.29) (8.89) 
Leverage -0.0526 -0.9297*** 
 (-0.74) (-5.32) 
ROA -0.7359*** 0.2757* 
 (-9.10) (1.80) 
Cash/asset 0.3677*** 0.3611* 
 (3.73) (1.74) 
Dividend/asset -1.2589** 4.3301*** 
 (-2.35) (2.75) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0518*** 0.2193*** 
 (4.68) (8.95) 
log(Firm age) 0.0150 0.0412 
 (0.98) (1.09) 
Constant 0.0324*** 0.0866*** 
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 (4.37) (4.74) 
Observations 16,477 16,477 
R-squared  0.1779 
Year FE Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm 
Underidentification test: 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 
p-value 
 
666.7 
(0.00) 
 
Weak identification test:   
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistic 4540  
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 1057  
Overidentification test:   
Hansen J-statistic 
p-value 
1.326 
(0.2496) 
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Table 5 
Board connectedness and firm’s CSR performances: Difference-in-differences analysis 
 
This table reports change in CSR score following the death of independent director as a quasi-natural 
experiment. Our sample includes U.S. publicly traded firms (excluding the financial industry) from 
2002 to 2013. Panel A shows the balancing properties of 497 treatment firms that experience death of 
independent director(s) as an exogenous shock. For matching purposes, the control group consists of 
firms with no shock but that have characteristics similar to the treatment firm a year before the treatment 
firms’ shock. The propensity score matching (PSM) method matches the treatment and control groups. 
Panel B shows the regression results for a propensity-matched sample where the main dependent 
variable is CSR score. The main variable of interest is Death_dum, which equals 1 if an independent 
director dies in any firm-year and 0 otherwise. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. All the 
independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All 
variables are winsorized at both the 1% and 99% levels. Robust t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p 
< 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
Panel A: Balancing table for propensity score matching  
 
  Treatment group  Control group t-test 
Variables N 
Mean 
(standard errors) N 
Mean 
(standard errors) 
Treatment – control 
 
Q(N-score) 497 2.946 497 3.048 -0.103 
  (0.065)  (0.063)  
CEO network 497 5.248 497 5.332 -0.084 
  (0.103)  (0.102)  
CEO chair duality 497 0.712 497 0.744 -0.032 
  (0.020)  (0.020)  
Board independence 497 0.819 497 0.823 -0.003 
  (0.004)  (0.004)  
log(Assets) 497 7.245 497 7.287 -0.043 
  (0.072)  (0.078)  
Leverage 497 0.220 497 0.222 -0.002 
  (0.009)  (0.009)  
ROA 497 0.018 497 0.017 0.001 
  (0.007)  (0.007)  
Cash/asset 497 0.110 497 0.115 -0.005 
  (0.006)  (0.006)  
Dividend/asset 497 0.011 497 0.011 -0.000 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  
Tobin’s Q 497 1.653 497 1.709 -0.055 
  (0.061)  (0.064)  
log(Firm age) 497 2.898 497 2.941 -0.044 
  (0.039)  (0.041)  
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      Panel B: Difference-in-differences regression on propensity-score-matched sample 
 
 (Treatment-
control) 
(Treatment – 
control) & 
(post1-pre1) 
(Treatment – 
control) & 
(post-pre) 
(Treatment – 
control) & 
(post-pre) 
(Treatment – 
control) & 
(post-pre) 
(Treatment – 
control) & 
(post-pre) 
(Treatment – 
control) & 
(post-pre) 
Variables CSR score CSR score CSR score CSR score CSR score, 
base controls 
as matching 
CSR score2, 
Adhikary, 
2016 
CSR score3, 
Lins et al., 
2017 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
Death_dum -0.1062 -0.2917** -0.4388*** -0.2742** -0.2136* -0.2364*** -0.0656** 
 (-0.62) (-2.05) (-3.33) (-2.53) (-1.95) (-2.92) (-2.40) 
Q(N-score) 0.0804*** 0.1351** 0.0964* 0.0189 0.0291 0.0211 0.0092 
 (3.33) (2.02) (1.94) (0.44) (0.64) (0.65) (0.80) 
CEO network 0.0447** 0.0297 0.0802*** -0.0123 -0.0208 -0.0053 -0.0038 
 (2.20) (0.70) (2.74) (-0.53) (-0.75) (-0.26) (-0.60) 
CEO chair duality -0.0674 -0.0998 -0.1375 -0.1177 0.0065 -0.0444 -0.0316 
 (-1.06) (-0.48) (-1.19) (-1.03) (0.06) (-0.46) (-1.08) 
Board independence 0.3896 1.2110 0.4842 -0.7239 0.3638 -0.2562 -0.1945 
 (1.24) (1.37) (0.78) (-1.15) (0.50) (-0.50) (-1.16) 
log(Assets) 0.2193*** 0.2661*** 0.4253*** -0.1521 -0.0093 -0.0888 -0.0745** 
 (5.72) (2.95) (5.57) (-1.32) (-0.08) (-0.94) (-2.53) 
Leverage -0.7417*** -0.7441 -0.9162*** 0.2122 0.4596 0.2059 0.1223 
 (-4.83) (-1.55) (-2.82) (0.72) (1.53) (0.85) (1.56) 
ROA 0.0258 0.3740 0.3877 0.9479*** 0.7621*** 0.1683 0.2069** 
 (0.20) (0.71) (1.26) (3.02) (2.72) (0.75) (2.54) 
Cash/asset 0.2633 1.4672** 1.3635*** -0.2382 0.2599 0.0419 -0.0645 
 (1.49) (2.44) (2.99) (-0.72) (0.86) (0.17) (-0.78) 
Dividend/asset 5.7911*** 6.7999* 5.7643* 0.8811 1.8228 0.5509 0.3387 
 (3.13) (1.66) (1.81) (0.44) (0.95) (0.33) (0.68) 
Tobin’s Q 0.1025*** 0.1327** 0.2089*** -0.0244 0.0085 -0.0465* -0.0168 
 (5.17) (2.53) (4.51) (-0.59) (0.23) (-1.69) (-1.61) 
log(Firm age) 0.1370*** 0.1878** 0.0475 -0.7096*** -0.7023*** -0.6758*** -0.1288*** 
 (5.56) (2.07) (0.57) (-3.72) (-3.60) (-4.64) (-2.67) 
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Constant -3.8433*** -5.8494*** -6.1459*** 2.8512*** 0.6928 2.1502** 0.7701*** 
 (-6.74) (-5.36) (-8.05) (2.67) (0.64) (2.38) (2.86) 
Observations 4,425 830 5,682 5,682 5,743 5,682 5,682 
R-squared 0.1473 0.1597 0.1844 0.1300 0.1108 0.0453 0.1079 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes No No No No 
Firm FE No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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Table 6 
Board connectedness and firm’s CSR performances: Reverse causality 
This table reports additional robustness checking on reverse causality. Our sample 
includes U.S. publicly traded firms (excluding the financial industry) from 2002 to 
2013. Column 1 report baseline regression assuming Constant board, which 
defined a dummy variable that equals 1 if there is no change in board composition 
over two consecutive years following Faleye et al. (2014). Column 2 re-produces 
the baseline regression results by lagging the Q(N-score) three periods with 
Constant board assumption. Finally, in Column 3, we re-estimated baseline model 
by augmenting lagged dependent variable along with Constant board assumption. 
The dependent variable in all models is CSR score. Table A1 in the appendix 
defines all variables. All the independent variables are lagged by one year (unless 
otherwise mentioned). Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables 
are winsorized at both the 1% and 99% levels. Robust t-statistics appear in 
parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
 
 
Variables CSR score  CSR score  CSR score  
 (1) (2) (3) 
Q(N-score)t-1 0.0983***  0.0311*** 
 (2.75)  (4.08) 
Q(N-score)t-3  0.1314***  
  (3.23)  
CSR scoret-1   0.8222*** 
   (131.30) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 4,747 3,474 4,747 
R-squared 0.1819 0.2048 0.1818 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm 
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Table 7 
Additional robustness checking. 
This table reports results on additional robustness test. Our sample includes U.S. 
publicly traded firms (excluding the financial industry) from 2002 to 2013. Panel A 
employs alternative definitions of CSR. In Column 1, we use CSR, excluding 
product and including human rights, following Adhikary (2016). In Column 2, we 
use the scaled version of CSR, following Lins et al. (2017), and, in Column 3, we 
re-estimate the base model, excluding the financial crisis (2008-09) (Lins et al., 
2017). In Panel B, we follow Akbas et al. (2016) to define an alternative measure of 
board connectedness. We use the first principal component of the all the centrality 
measures (degree, betweenness, eigenvector) and then regress the first principal 
component on firm size, board size, firm size, the year dummy, and the industry 
dummy. The residual of the regression is used as an overall board connectivity 
measure. The orthogonalized version of the individual and aggregate network 
measures (PC1_resid) is regressed on firms’ CSR score. In Panel C, we use an 
alternative fixed effects model to estimate the baseline regression and check the 
sensitivity against two alternative definitions of CSR. Table A1 in the appendix 
defines all variables. All the independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard 
errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at both the 1% and 
99% levels. Robust t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p 
< 0.1. 
 
Panel A: Baseline regression with alternative CSR definitions and excluding financial 
crisis 
 
 CSR score2, 
Adhikary 
2016 
CSR score3, 
Lins et al. 
2017 
CSR score, 
excluding fin 
crisis  
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Q(N-score) 0.1256*** 0.0356*** 0.1033*** 
 (5.97) (5.25) (4.12) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,477 16,477 11,782 
R-squared 0.2241 0.1401 0.1921 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm 
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    Panel B: Baseline regression with alternative network measure 
 
 CSR score CSR score CSR score CSR score 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) 
PC1_resid 0.3455***    
 (4.25)    
Degree_resid  0.0998***   
  (4.25)   
Eigenvector_resid   12.6294***  
   (4.25)  
Between_resid    256.8827*** 
    (4.25) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,788 16,788 16,788 16,788 
R-squared 0.1789 0.1789 0.1789 0.1789 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
 
 
Panel C: Baseline regression with alternative CSR definitions and an alternative    
estimation method 
 
 CSR score CSR score2, 
Adhikary 2016 
CSR score3,  
Lins et al.,2017 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Q(N-score) 0.1142*** 0.1251*** 0.0351*** 
 (4.39) (5.92) (5.15) 
Other controls Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 16,473 16,473 16,473 
R-squared 0.1914 0.2354 0.1498 
Year-by-industry 
FE 
Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm 
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Table 8 
Board connectedness and firms’ CSR performance: Information advantage of network. 
This table reports the effect of information advantage of board connectedness. Our sample includes U.S. publicly traded firms (excluding 
the financial industry) from 2002 to 2013. We measure firms’ information value using two proxies: Complexity and Advisory-focused 
board. Following Coles et al. (2008), we define complexity as an index based on the scope of a firm’s operations (i.e., diversified across 
products markets), firm’s size, and the extent of a firm’s reliance on external capital (i.e., higher leverage). We define Advisory-focused 
board as an indicator variable that equals 1 if the majority of independent directors serve on a finance/investment/strategy committee 
and/or an executive committee (Faleye et al., 2011). To treat the endogenous variable Q(N-score), we employ two instruments, the 
descriptions of which are available in section 4.2.1. Columns 1 (4) and 2 (5) report the first-stage estimates of an instrumental variable 
regression, and Column 3 (6) reports second-stage regression estimates. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. All the independent 
variables are lagged by one year and the sample period is from 2002 to 2013. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables 
are winsorized at both the 1% and 99% levels. Robust t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
 First stage Second stage First stage Second stage 
 Q(N-score) Complexity 
* Q(N-score) 
CSR score Q(N-score) Advisory-
focused board 
* Q(N-score) 
CSR score 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Complexity* Q(N-score)   0.3545***    
   (6.25)    
Complexity 0.0140 1.8418*** -1.3317***    
 (0.39) (25.91) (-7.44)    
Advisory-focused board * Q(N-score)      0.3277*** 
      (3.82) 
Advisory-focused board    0.0786 1.7585*** -0.9971*** 
    (1.54) (31.97) (-3.88) 
Q(N-score)   0.0413   0.1091** 
   (0.83)   (2.00) 
Fraction_indep_MBA 0.4166*** 0.0636  0.3923*** -0.0830***  
 (4.67) (0.74)  (4.39) (-3.97)  
Sector_indep 1.5833*** -0.0571  1.5427*** -0.0447***  
70 
 
 (42.17) (-1.46)  (41.19) (-3.97)  
Complexity* Fraction_indep_MBA 0.0891 0.5269***     
 (1.02) (2.88)     
Complexity* Sector_indep -0.0514* 1.6514***     
 (-1.73) (27.75)     
Advisory-focused board * 
Fraction_indep_MBA 
   0.2066 0.7222***  
    (1.36) (4.56)  
Advisory-focused board * 
Sector_indep 
   0.0588 1.7689***  
    (1.16) (36.56)  
CEO network 0.0326*** 0.0233*** 0.0797*** 0.0310*** 0.0116*** 0.0855*** 
 (4.41) (2.70) (4.29) (4.20) (2.89) (4.68) 
CEO chair duality -0.0315 0.0575* 0.0047 -0.0270 0.0173 0.0283 
 (-1.08) (1.86) (0.07) (-0.94) (1.05) (0.46) 
Board independence 3.4591*** 1.3957*** -0.0405 3.3608*** 0.6078*** -0.0825 
 (22.53) (7.21) (-0.10) (22.14) (7.95) (-0.21) 
log(Assets) 0.2085*** 0.0641*** 0.4341*** 0.1929*** 0.0603*** 0.3856*** 
 (14.15) (3.38) (9.04) (15.63) (7.90) (8.67) 
Leverage -0.0600 -0.2295*** -0.7886*** -0.0473 0.0051 -0.9159*** 
 (-0.84) (-2.71) (-4.46) (-0.67) (0.13) (-5.26) 
ROA -0.7600*** -0.2427** 0.5633*** -0.7084*** -0.2591*** 0.3144** 
 (-9.13) (-1.99) (3.33) (-8.82) (-5.91) (2.05) 
Cash/asset 0.3841*** 0.2987*** 0.1315 0.3591*** 0.0381 0.3815* 
 (3.81) (2.74) (0.62) (3.64) (0.67) (1.85) 
Dividend/asset -1.2766** 1.0124* 4.1012*** -1.3268** -0.4479 4.2616*** 
 (-2.36) (1.70) (2.60) (-2.49) (-1.39) (2.76) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0546*** 0.0132 0.1931*** 0.0499*** 0.0186*** 0.2165*** 
 (4.85) (1.11) (7.58) (4.50) (3.21) (8.87) 
log(Firm age) 0.0170 0.0469*** 0.0372 0.0078 0.0106 0.0315 
 (1.09) (2.63) (0.98) (0.51) (1.31) (0.84) 
Constant -2.8637*** -1.7553*** -5.2416*** -2.6712*** -1.1579*** -5.2320*** 
 (-11.14) (-5.75) (-7.14) (-11.02) (-8.55) (-7.50) 
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Observations 16,251 16,251 16,251 16,320 16,320 16,320 
R-squared   0.1589   0.1774 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 580.9   667.3   
Kleibergen-Paap (p-value) 0   0   
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics 2,125   2295   
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 450.2   543.4   
Hansen J-statistic 2.595   3.839   
p-value 0.273   0.147   
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Table 9 
Board connectedness and firms’ CSR performance: Cross-sectional analysis. 
This table reports information value of network for a cross-section of firm. Our sample includes U.S. 
publicly traded firms (excluding the financial industry) from 2002 to 2013. For this analysis, we look 
at firms where information advantage of network will be more beneficial given a high cost of acquiring 
information. Following Duchin et al. (2010), we define Info_cost as an index constructed by the size-
adjusted ranking of analysts’ forecast dispersion, coverage, and absolute forecast error as a proxy for 
the cost of acquiring information. We partition our sample into low governance (Lowgovscore), high 
stock return volatility (Highvol), low market capitalization (Lowmcap), and low institutional 
ownership (Lowinst) sub-samples. For each sub-sample, we estimate the low (high) threshold by 
comparing it to the below (above) yearly industry median values. Govscore is estimated by subtracting 
KLD-provided governance concerns from governance strengths (following Lins et al., 2017) for each 
firm-year; Vol is the rolling 24-month standard deviation in stock return; Mcap is the monthly average 
market capitalization of the firm; and Inst is the percentage of institutional ownership in the firm. The 
dependent variable in all models is CSR score, which is estimated using KLD data. The main 
independent variable of interest is Q(N-score), which quintile ranking of N-score. Where N-score is 
defined as the average of quintile ranking of all three centrality measures by year. Table A1 in the 
appendix defines all variables. All the independent variables are lagged by one year. Standard errors 
are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at both the 1% and 99% levels. Robust t-
statistics appear in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
 High info cost 
and Poor gov 
High info cost 
and High 
volatility 
High info cost 
and Low mkt 
cap 
High info cost 
and 
 Low inst.  
ownership 
 Variables CSR score CSR score CSR score CSR score 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
     
Q(N-score) 0.0901*** 0.0713* 0.0802*** 0.0789** 
 (3.07) (1.83) (2.61) (2.05) 
CEO network 0.0776*** 0.1029*** 0.0613*** 0.0580*** 
 (3.67) (3.72) (3.14) (2.68) 
CEO chair duality 0.0918 0.1701* 0.1300* 0.1073 
 (1.29) (1.91) (1.82) (1.22) 
Board independence 0.0784 0.2891 -0.0403 0.4743 
 (0.17) (0.58) (-0.09) (0.96) 
log(Assets) 0.0802 0.0358 0.0790 0.1432** 
 (1.52) (0.50) (1.34) (2.19) 
Leverage -0.4730*** -0.4699** -0.4567** -0.6886*** 
 (-2.62) (-2.00) (-2.55) (-2.90) 
ROA 0.0042 0.0318 -0.1238 -0.4599** 
 (0.03) (0.17) (-0.84) (-2.33) 
Cash/asset 0.1227 0.1861 0.0734 0.1985 
 (0.66) (0.74) (0.39) (0.98) 
Dividend/asset 2.2055* 1.9887 2.7196** 4.9158*** 
 (1.68) (1.21) (2.15) (2.83) 
73 
 
Tobin’s Q 0.0442** 0.0501* 0.0293 0.0212 
 (2.02) (1.81) (1.23) (0.78) 
log(Firm age) 0.0770** 0.0785* 0.0923*** 0.0707* 
 (2.12) (1.80) (2.62) (1.70) 
Constant -0.4646 -0.0209 0.3775 0.1113 
 (-0.59) (-0.02) (0.46) (0.14) 
     
Observations 3,653 2,242 3,406 2,003 
Adjusted R-squared 0.1372 0.1059 0.1338 0.1889 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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Table 10 
Diversity in board network connections and CSR components. 
This table reports the effect of diversity in board network connections on CSR components. Our 
sample includes U.S. publicly traded firms (excluding the financial industry) from 2002 to 2013. 
We report regression results on five separate components i.e. Comm_net, Div_net, Env_net, 
Emp_net and Pro_net. To measure the degree of diversity in board network connections in each 
firm-year, we estimate (a) the percentage of connections to top-25 charitable firms in the United 
States (Charity_pct); (b) the percentage of female connections (Female_pct); (c) the percentage of 
connections to non-polluting industries (Non-polluting_pct); (d) the percentage of connections 
working in unionized industries (Union_pct); and (e) the percentage of connections working in 
R&D-intensive industries (R&D_pct). To find the board-level measures, all the proxies are 
averaged over all independent directors. For the regression, we use the quintile ranking of the board 
based on each dimension of network connection. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. 
All the independent variables are lagged by one year and. Standard errors are clustered at the firm 
level. All variables are winsorized at both the 1% and 99% levels. Robust t-statistics appear in 
parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
 Comm_net Div_net Env_net Emp_net Pro_net 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Q(Charity_pct) 0.0287***     
 (2.96)     
Q(Female_pct)  0.3077***    
  (25.36)    
Q(Non-polluting_pct)   0.0717***   
   (8.09)   
Q(Union_pct)    0.0222**  
    (2.24)  
Q(R&D_pct)     0.0179*** 
     (3.42) 
Q(N-score) 0.0092* 0.0427*** 0.0254*** -0.0148 -0.0056 
 (1.74) (3.34) (2.69) (-1.40) (-0.91) 
CEO network 0.0108*** 0.0362*** 0.0117* 0.0184*** 0.0034 
 (3.47) (4.35) (1.78) (2.64) (0.79) 
CEO chair duality 0.0173 0.0445 0.0051 -0.0405 -0.0038 
 (1.45) (1.48) (0.21) (-1.54) (-0.25) 
Board independence -0.0153 0.2160 -0.0046 -0.1104 -0.1272 
 (-0.24) (1.24) (-0.04) (-0.72) (-1.32) 
log(Assets) 0.0601*** 0.2890*** 0.0459*** 0.1023*** -0.1049*** 
 (7.05) (16.89) (2.95) (6.32) (-10.86) 
Leverage -0.1003*** -0.4521*** -0.0642 -0.3018*** 0.0067 
 (-3.26) (-5.59) (-1.10) (-4.21) (0.15) 
ROA -0.0451* -0.2997*** 0.0701 0.2724*** 0.1937*** 
 (-1.80) (-3.90) (1.49) (3.89) (5.09) 
Cash/asset 0.0058 0.3927*** 0.0235 0.0919 -0.1216** 
 (0.15) (3.78) (0.37) (1.11) (-2.42) 
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Dividend/asset 1.1836*** 2.2337*** 0.8572* 0.1039 -1.4413*** 
 (3.60) (3.15) (1.70) (0.16) (-2.88) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0279*** 0.0801*** 0.0431*** 0.0701*** 0.0013 
 (5.73) (7.02) (6.46) (6.95) (0.23) 
log(Firm age) -0.0029 0.0488*** -0.0262* 0.0278** -0.0083 
 (-0.40) (2.89) (-1.88) (2.03) (-0.89) 
Constant -0.7200*** -3.8777*** -1.5369** -0.6377* 0.3083 
 (-5.31) (-8.14) (-2.43) (-1.78) (0.76) 
Observations 16,477 16,477 14,936 14,936 14,936 
R-squared 0.0905 0.4451 0.1302 0.1532 0.1292 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Cluster Firm Firm Firm Firm Firm 
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Table 11 
Board connectedness and firms’ CSR performance: Information versus influence.  
This table reports the influence effect of board connectedness. Our sample includes U.S. publicly traded firms 
(excluding the financial industry) from 2002 to 2013. We employ two proxies to measure CEO power and board 
power: (1) CEO chair duality and (2) Co-option. CEO chair duality is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the CEO is also 
the chairman of board and 0 otherwise. Non_dual firms do not have a CEO with a dual role and are defined as (1-
CEO chair duality). Co-option is defined as the proportion of co-opted directors on a board, where co-opted directors 
are the independent directors that were appointed after the CEO assumed the position. Lowco-option is a dummy 
variable that equals 1 if the firm’s proportion of co-option is below the yearly industry median. To treat the endogenous 
variable Q(N-score), we employ two instruments, the descriptions of which are available in section 4.2.1. Columns 1 
(4) and 2 (5) report the first-stage estimates of an instrumental variable regression, and Column 3 (6) reports second-
stage regression estimates. Table A1 in the appendix defines all variables. All the independent variables are lagged 
by one year. Standard errors are clustered at the firm level. All variables are winsorized at both the 1% and 99% levels. 
Robust t-statistics appear in parentheses. *** p < 0.01; ** p < 0.05; * p < 0.1. 
 
 Q(N-score) Non_dual 
*  
Q(N-score) 
CSR score Q(N-score) Low co-
option *  
Q(N-score) 
CSR score 
 Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
Non_dual * Q(N-score)   -0.1132    
   (-1.46)    
Non_dual 0.0392 1.6347***     
 (0.73) (33.71)     
Low co-option* Q(N-score)      0.1279 
      (1.37) 
Low co-option    0.0854 1.3296*** -0.2989 
    (1.31) (25.04) (-1.16) 
Q(N-score)   0.2309***   0.1926** 
   (3.99)   (2.18) 
Fraction_indep_MBA 0.4330*** -0.1072***  0.5606*** -0.2184***  
 (4.42) (-4.09)  (3.75) (-3.39)  
Sector_indep 1.5638*** -0.0823***  1.5258*** -0.0755***  
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 (38.93) (-6.03)  (27.17) (-2.70)  
Non-dual * Fraction_indep_MBA 0.0581 0.7253***     
 (0.38) (4.68)     
Non_dual * Sector_indep -0.0247 1.6185***     
 (-0.44) (31.69)     
Lco-option * Fraction_indep_MBA    0.1149 1.0036***  
    (0.63) (5.52)  
Lco-option * Sector_indep    -0.0215 1.6989***  
    (-0.34) (32.96)  
CEO network 0.0324*** 0.0117** 0.0861*** 0.0270*** 0.0003 0.0709** 
 (4.37) (2.54) (4.72) (2.60) (0.04) (2.58) 
CEO chair duality    0.0115 0.0946*** -0.0488 
    (0.30) (3.08) (-0.49) 
Board independence 3.4611*** 0.6488*** -0.2738 3.8024*** 1.5718*** -0.4225 
 (22.44) (8.14) (-0.68) (17.66) (9.91) (-0.67) 
log(Assets) 0.2007*** 0.0775*** 0.3987*** 0.2011*** 0.1115*** 0.5086*** 
 (16.23) (9.79) (8.90) (11.75) (8.57) (7.45) 
Leverage -0.0507 0.0333 -0.9057*** 0.0179 -0.0271 -1.0586*** 
 (-0.71) (0.63) (-5.15) (0.17) (-0.32) (-2.95) 
ROA -0.7330*** -0.2485*** 0.2893* -0.6092*** -0.0736 0.4117 
 (-9.06) (-3.90) (1.89) (-3.68) (-0.67) (1.08) 
Cash/asset 0.3677*** 0.2404*** 0.3745* 0.3395** 0.3007*** 1.1228*** 
 (3.73) (3.58) (1.81) (2.09) (2.68) (2.67) 
Dividend/asset -1.2730** -1.0349*** 4.1685*** -0.4923 -1.0850* 4.5880* 
 (-2.37) (-2.89) (2.64) (-0.61) (-1.76) (1.90) 
Tobin’s Q 0.0517*** 0.0186*** 0.2185*** 0.0285 0.0068 0.2535*** 
 (4.66) (2.70) (8.88) (1.53) (0.54) (5.78) 
log(Firm age) 0.0149 -0.0193* 0.0376 -0.0146 0.0117 -0.0228 
 (0.97) (-1.84) (1.00) (-0.57) (0.66) (-0.31) 
Constant -2.8180*** -0.9706*** -5.4921*** -2.9774*** -2.1528*** -6.4298*** 
 (-11.42) (-8.85) (-8.07) (-10.00) (-6.95) (-8.101 
       
Observations 16,320 16,320 16,320 9,113 9,113 9,113 
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R-squared   0.1786   0.1930 
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM statistic 353   323   
Kleibergen-Paap (p-value) 0   0   
Cragg-Donald Wald F-statistics 1,820   1,017   
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistic 250.5   225.9   
Hansen J-statistic 3.826   1.721   
p-value 0.1589   0.423   
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